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IS THE "CRISIS" IN THE CIVIL JUSTICE
SYSTEM REAL OR IMAGINED?
Steven B. Hantler*
Mark A. Behrens**
Leah Lorber***
Over the past two decades, the American civil justice system has
become increasingly inefficient, unfair, and unpredictable. Coupled
with the litigation culture spurred by these breakdowns, the nation's
courts, on the whole, are losing their ability to administer justice. In
recent years, anecdotes of verdicts that shock the collective
conscience have become part of civil justice lore: a $4 million
verdict for a bad paint job on a doctor's luxury carl or a nearly $3
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1. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619 (Ala. 1994) (ordering
remittitur of $2 million of $4 million punitive award, where compensatory
damages were $4,000), rev'd, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (ruling $2 million punitive
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million verdict for a woman who spilled a cup of McDonald's coffee
when she removed the lid after leaving a drive-through window.
2
These cases represent just the tip of the iceberg. In many cases, the
civil justice system simply breaks down because the end result of a
lawsuit tends to be driven more by business concerns than the
appropriate legal outcome.
Frustration with the civil justice system is widespread. Doctors
are choosing where to practice based on liability laws and insurance
rates, companies are offsetting their increased liability costs by
raising prices and cutting jobs, and, when people need to use the civil
justice system themselves, they are finding it overburdened with
unnecessary claims. As the 2004 election has shown, the public is
becoming more aware of how a failure in the civil justice system
affects their own lives. In response to the public's concerns, both
major party presidential candidates endorsed certain civil justice
reforms, and a number of state ballot initiatives favoring civil justice
reform passed.3
award was grossly excessive so as to violate constitutional due process and
setting forth guidelines for future review of punitive awards).
2. Liebeck v. McDonald's Rests., P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995
WL 360309 (N.M. Dist. Aug. 18, 1999) ($2.7 million punitive award and
$160,000 compensatory award); see Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How
a Jury Decided that One Coffee Spill Is Worth $2.9 Million, WALL ST. J. EUR.,
Sept. 2, 1994, at 1.
3. For example, California Proposition 64, an initiative narrowing the
scope of California Business and Professions Code Section 17200, the "unfair
competition" law, passed 59% to 41%. See Votes For and Against Statewide
Ballot Measures, Nov. 2, 2004, at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/sov/
2004_general/contents.htm; see also Florida Department of State Division of
Elections, Official Results, Constitutional Amendment (Florida's Amendment
No. 3, the Medical Liability Claimant's Compensation Amendment, a measure
limiting lawyers' contingency fees in medical malpractice cases, passed
63.6% to 36.4%), at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/
Index.asp?ElectionDate=ll/2/04&DATAMODE='; State of Nevada, 2004
Official General Election Results, Nov. 2, 2004 (Nevada's Question 3, a
measure limiting noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases, passed
59.34% to 40.59%; Nevada's Question 4, a trial lawyer-backed measure
undercutting medical liability reform through insurance regulation, failed
34.71% to 65.22% and Nevada Question 5, a measure forbidding legislative
reductions of liability, failed 37.16% to 62.78%), at http://sos.state.nv.us/
nvelection/2004General/ElectionSummary.htm"; Statewide Candidates'
Abstract--Official Wyoming General Election Results-Nov. 2, 2004
[hereinafter Wyoming Election Results] (Wyoming Amendment C, passed
124,178 to 110,169, and authorizes the legislature to set up a panel to review
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As policy makers around the country take their cues from these
trends and look for ways to enhance the ability of the courts to
administer justice, it is important to start with a baseline
understanding of what the American civil justice system is intended
to achieve. The American civil justice system has two purposes: to
compensate people for injuries caused by others, and to deter future
misconduct of the type that caused those injuries.4 This Article
explores some of the ways in which the civil justice system is falling
short of these twin purposes, the impact that these failings have on
the economy and the democratic process, and the trends that, if left
unimpeded, will knock the scales of justice further out of balance.
Finally, the Article suggests ways the civil justice system can be
fixed to remove the incentive for abuse.
I. FAILURES OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM
The American civil justice system is a "transfer mechanism": It
transfers compensation from those who cause injuries to those who
sustain injuries for which the law provides relief.5 Effective and
reliable transfer mechanisms tend to have four attributes: They are
medical malpractice cases before they go to court), at
http://soswy.state.wy.us/election/2004/results/04-gsum.htm; Colorado
Cumulative Report Official Results, Nov. 23, 2004 (Colorado Amendment 34,
a trial lawyer-backed initiative to significantly expand ability to sue builders
over alleged construction defects, defeated 23.45% to 76.55%),
at http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/general/COLORADO-CUMULA-
TIVE.htm. But see Oregon's November 2, 2004, General Election Abstract of
Votes, State Measure No. 35, at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/
g04abstract.html (Oregon's medical malpractice reform defeated 869,054 to
896,857); Wyoming Election Results, supra (Wyoming Amendment D, a
measure to authorize legislature to limit non-economic damages for medical
malpractice, defeated 115,981 to 117,602). Under an unusual Wyoming rule,
ballots uncast for referendum measures are counted as "no" votes. See WYO.
CONST. art III, § 52(f).
4. E.g., Daniel P. Kessler, The Economic Effects of the Liability System,
HOOVER INST., at http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/publications/epp/91/91a.
html (last visited June 17, 2005).
5. See id.; MARK GEISTFELD, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN A UNIFIED
CONCEPTION OF TORT LAW 22 (Boalt Working Papers in Pub. Law, Paper No.
33, 2003) ("Any tort rule can be conceptualized as a transfer mechanism
between the right-holder and duty-holder, which in turn poses the economic
question of whether a fair tort rule satisfies the efficiency-equity criterion."), at
http://repositories.cdlib.org/boaltwp/33.
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efficiency, timeliness, predictability and fairness. 6 At present, the
U.S. tort system, as a whole, is losing ground in all of these areas.
A. Costs of the United States Tort System
The United States tort system is far and away the most
expensive in the world; "our dispute-driven system requires troubling
amounts of resources, such as the time of claimants, attorneys,
judges, and juries." 7 In 2002, the President's Council of Economic
Advisors compared the U.S. civil justice system with tort systems in
other countries and found that the U.S. system is more than twice as
expensive as the average cost of other major industrialized nations.
8
In 2003, the U.S. tort system cost $246 billion.9 This is more
than the amount of federal revenue collected from the corporate
income tax.' 0 It also is "far more than enough money to solve Social
Security's long-term financing crisis"" and could pay for all the
following government programs combined: "Education, training, and
employment; general science; space and technology; conservation
and land management; pollution control and abatement; disaster
relief and insurance; community development; Federal law
enforcement and administration of justice; and unemployment
compensation."' 12 In 2003, this aggregate cost translated to $809 per
6. Steven B. Hantler, Remarks at General Motors Roadslow, After the
$4.9 Billion GM Verdict: Is Silicon Valley the Next GM? (Sept. 23, 1999) ("an
economist would also say the indicators of a well-functioning transfer
mechanism are, in the case of compensation transfer, that it be done
fairly, predictably, timely and cost-effectively") (transcript available at
http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Transcripts/gmsiliconvalley.htm).
7. Steven Garber, Should We Give Up On Medical Product Liability?,
RAND REV., Summer 2004, at http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/
issues/summer2004/38.html.
8. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, WHO PAYS FOR TORT LIABILITY
CLAIMS? AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM 1-2
(2002) [hereinafter CEA REP.] (citing TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, U.S.
TORT COSTS: 2000, TRENDS AND FINDINGS ON THE COSTS OF THE U.S
TORT SYSTEM (2002)), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/
tortliabilitysystem~apr02.pdf.
9. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, U.S. TORT COSTS: 2004 UPDATE,
TRENDS AND FINDINGS ON THE COST OF THE U.S. TORT SYSTEM 2 2004
[hereinafter U.S. TORT COSTS: 2004 UPDATE], available at http://www.
towersperrin.com/tillinghast/publications/reports/Tort_2004.pdf.
10. CEA REP., supra note 8, at 17.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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U.S. citizen, which was the equivalent of over a 5% tax on wages for
each wage earner. 13 In 2004, the aggregate cost increased to $845
per U.S. citizen. 14 In real life terms, the U.S. tort system is costing
three months of groceries, or six months of utility payments, for
average income American families. 15
Further, tort costs are growing increasingly faster and at a
disproportionate rate. From 1984 through 2003, the costs of the tort
system increased by 367%, from $67 billion16 to $246 billion. 17 Tort
costs represented only 0.6% of America's gross domestic product
("GDP") in 1950, 1.3% of GDP in 1970,18 and more than 2% of GDP
by 2001.1"
B. Ability to Compensate Claimants
The U.S. tort system is inefficient, slow, and unpredictable.
Plaintiffs are now receiving less than 50% of the money spent on
litigation, and their recovery for actual economic loss amounts to
only 22% of those costs.20 Moreover, their claims take a long time to
resolve. Product liability cases (excluding asbestos cases) take an
average of nearly three years from filing to verdict or judgment.
2 1
13. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, U.S. TORT COSTS: 2003 UPDATE 1
(2003) [hereinafter U.S. TORT COSTS: 2003 UPDATE], available at
http://www.towersperrin.com/tillinghast/publications/reports/2003_TortsCost
sUpdateTortCostsTrends_2003_Update.pdf.
14. U.S. TORT COSTS: 2004 UPDATE, supra note 9, at 2.
15. Steven B. Hantler, The Seven Myths of Highly Effective Trial Lawyers,
No. 42 CIV. JUST. FORUM 6 (Center for Legal Pol'y, Manhattan Inst. Apr.
2004).
16. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, TORT COST TRENDS: AN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1995) (costs were $67 billion in 1984).
17. U.S. TORT COSTS: 2004 UPDATE, supra note 9, at 2 (showing the
average annual increase in tort systems cost).
18. Id. at 2.
19. Press Release, Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, U.S. Tort Costs Climbed to
$205 Billion in 2001 (Feb. 11, 2003), at http://www.towersperrin.com/
tillinghast/press/2003_press/prO2112003.htm.
20. See id. at 2-3. A 1986 study by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice
found that for a variety of tort cases, including product liability, it took
between $16 million to $19 million in resources to deliver between $14 billion
to $16 billion in compensation to plaintiffs. See JAMES S. KAKALIK &
NICHOLAS M. PACE, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COSTS AND
COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION 69 (1986).
21. See Thomas H. Cohen & Steven K. Smith, Bureau of Justice Statistics
Bulletin: Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001, 8 (Apr.
1125
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Medical malpractice cases take nearly as long.22 On average, tort
trials reach a verdict or judgment in a little more than two years.
23
In addition, the amount of compensation plaintiffs receive tends
to be arbitrary and unpredictable; it does not reflect the plaintiffs'
actual loss. Harvard Law Professor W. Kip Viscusi, who studied this
issue, observed that "[l]arge loss claims tend to be
undercompensated, and lower loss claims tend to be
overcompensated.",24 Some plaintiffs may receive windfall verdicts
while other plaintiffs with similar claims receive little or nothing.
Steven Garber, senior economist at the RAND Institute for Civil
Justice, explained that "[t]he disparities stem from several factors:
difficulties in determining causes of injuries; differences in skill and
charisma among attorneys and expert witnesses; varying attitudes of
individual judges and juries; and somewhat infrequent, but
sometimes enormous, punitive damage awards."
25
C. Ability to Deter Misconduct
It also is questionable whether the tort system achieves its
second goal: to make goods and services safer by deterring
undesirable business practices. The tort system is supposed to create
incentives for parties most able to prevent and reduce risks to do so.
But that can only happen when the responsible parties are aware of
the potential for tort liability and can take corrective steps. The
deterrent aspect of the civil justice system does not work when
liability is applied haphazardly. For example, in one case, a party
2004) (survey of state courts of general jurisdiction in nation's seventy-five
largest counties found that non-asbestos products liability cases take 35.1
months to resolve, compared with 25.6 months for all tort cases, 21.7 months
for real property cases, and 21.5 months for contract cases), at http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mmtvlc01 .pdf.
22. See id. (listing 33.2 months as the average length for a medical
malpractice case).
23. See id.
24. W. KIp Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 52 (1991).
25. Garber, supra note 7, at http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/
issues/summer2004/38.html; see also Steven Garber, Product Liability,
Punitive Damages, Business Decisions and Economic Outcomes, 1998 WIS. L.
REV. 237, 291 n. 138 ("Whether a plaintiff receives any compensation at all in
a product liability case depends on various matters of chance such as the
relative skills of the attorneys on each side, the composition of the jury, and the
timing of case resolution relative to the timing of information about injury
causation coming to light.").
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who made a defective product can escape responsibility, while in
another case, liability is imposed regardless of whether the product
was defective or whether the product caused the harm.
Yale University law professor George Priest studied this nexus
between liability and safety and found little evidence that the
expansion of liability law enhances safety.26 His analysis showed
that although the annual numbers of tort suits and liability insurance
premiums rose sharply during the 1980s, injury rates for consumers
and workers, death rates from medical procedures, and aviation
accident rates declined no faster than they had been declining in the
1970s, when premium costs and the volume of tort suits were much
lower. 27  He concluded that "the basic doctrines of modem law
largely neglect the most effective methods of accident control.
' 28
Another study published several years later reached a similar
conclusion. This study found that while low and modest damage
awards can enhance safety, high damage awards can produce a
negative effect.29 The problem the authors uncovered was that in
response to high liability costs that make a new product more
expensive to produce, companies would decrease research and
development on innovative safety methods rather than assume the
risk of high levels of liability that come with novel products.3 ° When
26. See George L. Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate, in
LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 184 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford
Winston eds., 1988).
27. Id. at 187-93.
28. Id. at 222.
29. See W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Product Liability, Research
and Development, and Innovation, 101 J. POL. ECON. 161, 174-75 (1993).
30. See id. at 175. For example, prior to the enactment of the General
Aviation Revitalization Act in 1994, the products liability system added costs
of "$70,000 to $100,000 per [light airplane] built and shipped," while the cost
of U.S. automobiles increased by "hundreds of dollars per car sold." See THE
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, THE LIABILITY MAZE 18-19 (Peter W. Huber &
Robert E. Litan eds., 1991). In the late 1980s, approximately 15% of the costs
of American-made machine tools was attributed to products liability costs. See
Bill To Amend The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 Relating To General Aviation
Accidents: Hearings on H.R. 2238 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 100th Cong. 47 (1987) (testimony of Robert M. Malott,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, FMC Corporation). Similarly, as a
result of liability costs, the costs of a single dose of DPT vaccine rose from 12
cents in 1980 to about $12 dollars in 1987. See id. at 49.
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damages became excessively high, companies would either stagnate
or withdraw from the market altogether.
Finally, Dr. Viscusi of Harvard Law School released a study a
few years ago that considered whether risky behavior is deterred in
states that allow punitive damages compared with those that do not.
32
He reviewed an "extremely wide range of risk measures-toxic
chemical accidents, toxic chemical accidents causing injury or death,
toxic chemical discharges, surface water discharges, total toxic
releases, medical misadventure mortality rates, total accidental
mortality rates, and a variety of liability insurance premium
measures." 33  Dr. Viscusi concluded that "[s]tates with punitive
damages exhibit no safer risk performance than states without
punitive damages." 34 In fact, he found no overall difference with
regard to safety and environmental performance, and "there is no
deterrence benefit that justifies the chaos and economic disruption
inflicted by punitive damages."
35
In his analysis of these results, Dr. Viscusi observed that while
31. For example, due to unwarranted products liability litigation, Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals withdrew its anti-nausea morning sickness drug,
Bendectin, from the market in 1983. High Court Hears Views on Bendectin,
CHEM. MKTG. REP., Apr. 5, 1993, at 13. The drug had been approved by the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration and was widely acclaimed by health care
professionals, but Merrell Dow's legal defense costs were far in excess of the
amount received in annual sales of Bendectin. Id. For similar reasons, G.D.
Searle & Co. (a subsidiary of Monsanto) withdrew the Copper-7 intrauterine
device from the market in 1986, even though the product had been approved
by the FDA and used for many years. See Betsy Morris, Monsanto Unit Stops
Marketing Its IUDs in U.S., WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1986. Two of three
companies manufacturing the DPT vaccine stopped producing it in 1984 in
light of rising products liability costs. S. REP. No. 105-32, at 10 (1997). The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention subsequently asked doctors to stop
vaccinating children over age 1 to conserve the limited supply of the vaccine.
Id. While these provide a few examples, the problem is widespread. A 1988
survey by the Conference Board of more than 2,000 chief executive officers
found that 36% of the companies had discontinued product lines as a result of
actual liability experience and that 11% of the companies had done so based on
anticipated liability problems. Id. at 8.
32. W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against
Corporations in Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285, 298
(1998).
33. W. Kip Viscusi, Why There Is No Defense of Punitive Damages, 87
GEO. L.J. 381, 381 (1998).
34. Viscusi, supra note 32, at 298.
35. Id. at 287.
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the potential for punitive damages adds to the costs of risks, thereby
making safety precautions more attractive, juries award punitive
damages in such a capricious manner that there is no linkage
between the expected punitive damages and the firm's risk actions:
"[W]hen firms look forward, the prospect of punitive damages is so
uncertain that there is no deterrent effect." 36 He also found that there
is no need to augment the safety incentives provided by the market,
government regulation, and compensatory damages.37 Rather, the
increased costs of paying punitive damages "lead to higher prices
and other adverse economic effects."
38
II. TRENDS TOWARDS LESS EFFICIENCY,
PREDICTABILITY, TIMELINESS AND FAIRNESS
The delicate balance between costs and benefits is being pushed
further off-kilter by several national trends in civil litigation. These
trends include: (1) the skyrocketing costs of litigation, (2) the
growing disconnect between costs and fault, (3) the use of the civil
justice system for non-compensatory purposes, (4) the relaxation of
the traditional elements needed to file a tort claim, (5) the deprivation
of reliable and important information provided to juries, and (6) the
creation of "judicial hellholes." 39  This section of the Article
discusses the way each of these developments contributes to creating
a legal system that is less efficient, predictable, timely, and fair.
A. Trend 1: The Skyrocketing Costs of Litigation
1. Windfall Damages
Windfall compensatory awards-namely pain and suffering
damages-are quickly approaching arbitrary punitive damages
awards as a major contributor to the crisis in the civil justice
system. Arbitrary punitive damages awards have long been
36. Viscusi, supra note 33, at 383.
37. Id.; see also Viscusi, Social Costs, supra note 32, at 310-11, 317.
38. Viscusi, supra note 32, at 311.
39. The American Tort Reform Association, a client of Shook, Hardy &
Bacon L.L.P., has a trademark claim to the term "judicial hellholes."
40. See Hon. Paul V. Niemeyer, Awards for Pain and Suffering: The
Irrational Centerpiece of Our Tort System, 90 VA. L. REv. 1401 (2004); Victor
E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Twisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering
Awards: Turning Compensation Into "Punishment", 54 S.C. L. REv. 47
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criticized as contributing to the crisis in the civil justice system, as
the opportunity to obtain "jackpot justice" tends to encourage the
filing of meritless lawsuits.
This trend toward excessive pain and suffering awards appears
to be in response to efforts by the Supreme Court of the United
States to rein in "grossly excessive" 42 punitive awards. 43 Since the
1990s, recognizing that the arbitrary nature of punitive damages
awards threatens constitutional due process guarantees, the Court has
developed legal rules governing both the amount and procedures for
their assessment.
44
(2002).
41. The problem of arbitrary punitive damages awards spurring meritless
litigation has been identified in numerous areas of the law, not just tort
litigation. See Paul J. Siegel, Cutting-Edge Developments in Compliance:
Labor & Employment Law Issues, 1230 PRAC. L. INST. 487, 531 (2001)
(lowering the threshold for punitive damages would promote the filing of
meritless or avoidable litigation in employment law); Michael A. Berch &
Rebecca White Berch, An Essay Regarding Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, Inc. and the Demise of the Uniform Application of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 Miss. L.J. 715, 727 n.49 (1999) (observing that
the "right to be free from a punitive damages claim affords the party opposing
such a claim protection from the expense of having to litigate meritless claims
and the concomitant increase in the settlement value of a case once a claim for
punitive damages is added"); Note, "Common Sense" Legislation: The Birth of
Neoclassical Tort Reform, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1765, 1774 (1996) (stating that
punitive damages in tort litigation lead to the situation where "plaintiffs bring[]
meritless suits and receiving a windfall to which they are not entitled");
Richard M. Phillips & Christine E. Plaza, Reforming Securities Litigation,
BUS. L. TODAY, July-Aug. 1995, at 27 (in securities litigation, the award of
"punitive damages unrelated to any economic loss creates enormous exposure
for defendants that in turn generates immense pressure on these defendants to
settle even meritless claims"); James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive
Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117,
1156 (1984) (writing that "[a] byproduct of the continued success that
plaintiffs have experienced in obtaining large punitive damage awards is the
now universal practice of plaintiffs alleging and demanding punitive damages
in an effort to increase the ultimate recovery from juries, and to compel
defendants to settle meritless cases because of the fear that a jury will return an
outrageous punitive damage award").
42. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21 n.10 (1991).
43. Id. at 21-22. The Court noted in 1974 that few objective guidelines
existed for measuring punitive damages and that "[c]onsequently, juries assess
punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary
relation to the actual harm caused." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
350 (1974).
44. The court requires sufficient checks on the unlimited use of jury
1130
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Unfortunately, pain and suffering damages are starting to
supplement punitive damages awards as a source of "jackpot justice"
damages for plaintiffs. The issue, which somewhat mirrors the
punitive damages debate, is that there is no objective formula for
valuing pain and suffering awards.45 It is difficult to assess another
person's pain and suffering and then translate it into its financial
equivalent; "[j]uries are left with nothing but their consciences to
,46guide them. Because pain and suffering awards are inherently
subjective, courts generally uphold them absent a finding that the
award "shocks the conscience. 4 7  Therefore, juries can be
inappropriately swayed to increase the plaintiffs pain and suffering
award by evidence that is directed away from the plaintiff and
toward the wrongdoing of the defendant. This misuse of "guilt
evidence" upends the fundamental purpose of pain and suffering
awards-which is to compensate the plaintiff.
Through this technique, the defendant is "punished," but the
award is not subject to the extensive legal controls that help assure
discretion in the procedures governing the award and review of punitive
damages. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350; Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512
U.S. 415 (1994). The court has also established substantive limits on the
amount of punitive awards. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S.
443, 454 (1993). Additionally, there is a three-pronged constitutional test that
considers the reprehensibility of the misconduct, the relationship between the
penalty and the harm to the plaintiff, and the civil and criminal penalties for
comparable misbehavior. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-
85 (1996); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 424-25
(2003) (refining the Gore test). Lastly, appeals courts may take a "thorough,
independent review" of the constitutionality of an award, rather than deferring
to the trial court's decision making. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool
Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 441 (2001). See generally Victor E. Schwartz,
Mark A. Behrens & Joseph P. Mastrosimone, Reining in Punitive Damages
"Run Wild": Proposals for Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L.
REV. 1003 (2000) (discussing punitive damages reform approaches).
45. As one commentator noted, "Courts have usually been content to say
that pain and suffering damages should amount to 'fair compensation' or a
'reasonable amount,' without any more definite guide." Randall R. Bovbjerg,
Frank A. Sloan & James F. Blumstein, Valuing Life and Limb in Tort:
Scheduling "Pain and Suffering", 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 912 (1989).
46. Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73
CAL. L. REV. 772, 778 (1985).
47. Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Hedonic Damages: The Rapidly
Bubbling Cauldron, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1037, 1052, 1068 n.148 (2004).
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that real punitive awards do not cross the constitutional line.48 These
inflated compensatory damage awards also, in turn, can be used to
justify higher punitive damages than otherwise would be
constitutionally permissible.49 As one federal appeals court judge
wrote: "Without rational criteria for measuring damages for pain and
suffering, awarding such damages undermines the tort law's
rationality and predictability-two essential values of the rule of
law."' 50  The inefficiency and unfairness of the current system
snowball when these inflated compensatory damage awards, in turn,
are used to further justify higher punitive damages in the same trial.5'
48. Examples abound. The Mississippi Supreme Court in May 2004
overturned a $48 billion compensatory award against Janssen Pharmaceutica;
the original award in this pharmaceutical products liability case was $100
billion, $10 billion for each of six plaintiffs regardless of their actual damages,
injuries, ages, medical histories and other individual factors. The court
explained: "Essentially, Plaintiffs' counsel was making a punitive damages
argument for intentional fraud when the only issue before the jury was a
compensatory damages claim for negligent failure to warn. Such statements
made by counsel were intended to inflame and prejudice the jury. In awarding
each Plaintiff $10 million across the board, the jury responded to this
inflammatory and improper argument." Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Bailey,
878 So. 2d 31, 62 (Miss. 2004). For a more extensive discussion of this case,
see Victor E. Schwartz, Leah Lorber & Rochelle M. Tedesco, Taking a Stand
Against Lawlessness in American Courts: How Trial Court Judges and
Appellate Justices Can Protect Their Courts From Becoming Judicial
Hellholes, 27 AM. J. OF TRIAL ADVoc. 215 (2003). Similarly, in April 2004, a
Jefferson County, Texas state court jury rendered a $1 billion verdict against
Wyeth Pharmaceuticals in a wrongful death fen-phen case. The verdict
included $100 million in damages for pain and suffering, in addition to
approximately $1.6 million in economic damages and a $900 million punitive
award. The $100 million pain and suffering verdict was clearly the result of
evidence of the defendant's alleged wrongdoing. The trial court allowed the
plaintiffs to argue that the company committed a felony in its dealings with the
federal Food & Drug Administration, rendering the Texas statutory limits on
punitive damages inapplicable; the punitive award of nine times the
compensatory damages was built on this figure. Coffey v. Wyeth, No. E-167-
334 (Jefferson Cty. Dist. Ct. Apr. 27, 2004).
49. In State Farm, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that "few awards
exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages...
will satisfy due process," and that a ratio of four to one is "close to the line of
constitutional impropriety." 538 U.S. at 425. If the underlying compensatory
damages award results from an inflated pain and suffering award, the resulting
punitive award would be a multiple of the already overstated compensatory
damages.
50. Niemeyer, supra note 40, at 1401.
51. See supra note 47.
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2. Multiple Penalties for the Same Misconduct
Problems of inefficiency and unfairness are multiplied when
defendants are repeatedly assessed punitive damages for the same
misconduct. Punitive damages are "intended to punish the defendant
and to deter future wrongdoing."5 2 They have nothing to do with
compensating plaintiffs for their injuries. 3 Each individual plaintiff
can be made whole through compensatory damages, which provide
payment for economic losses (such as lost wages and medical
expenses) and noneconomic injuries (such as pain and suffering
awards). Subjecting a company to multiple punitive damage awards
for the same act or course of conduct is the civil law equivalent of
double jeopardy, and, in mass tort litigation, a company can be
assessed punitive damages literally hundreds or thousands of times.
54
Multiple punitive damages serve neither a compensatory nor a
deterrence function. Certainly, a responsible defendant should
provide compensation to each individual plaintiff when numerous
plaintiffs are injured because of a single wrongful act by the
defendant. Once the plaintiffs are made whole, however, it is not
logical to punish the defendant over and over for the same wrongful
act.55 With multiple punitive damages awards, individual plaintiffs
52. Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 432. See also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350
(noting that punitive damages "are not compensation for injury... [but] are
private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter
its future occurrence"); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining that punitive damages
are awarded to punish the defendant, to teach the defendant not to "do it
again," and to deter others from similar behavior).
53. See PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 549-50 (Victor E. Schwrtz
et al., eds., 10th ed. 2000).
54. As one commentator wrote, "[A] single design error, inadequate
warning or recurrent manufacturing mistake can permeate an entire product
line, resulting in tens, hundreds or thousands of personal injury lawsuits with
accompanying punitive damages claims. Individual awards that appear
reasonable can aggregate to threaten the very survival of a business entity."
John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive
Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 142 (1986); see also Richard A. Seltzer,
Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of
Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FoRDHAM L. REV. 37, 51 (1983).
55. See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Death by a Thousand
Cuts: How to Stop Multiple Imposition of Punitive Damages, BRIEFLY, Dec.
2003, at 1 (explaining that although common sense informs a parent's decision
to "not punish a child more than once for the same wrong-doing," the U.S.
"civil justice system has strayed from common sense and basic fairness").
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receive and the defendant is assigned disproportionate costs. Thus,
multiple punishment significantly skews the transfer mechanism of
the civil justice system.
Assessing multiple punitive damages also is an inefficient way
to deter future misconduct. First, there is the very real possibility of
over-deterrence. Faced with the potential onslaught of numerous
multi million- or billion-dollar punitive awards arising from, for
example, a single error in a product design, companies may just as
readily avoid engaging in beneficial behavior as in misconduct. As
long ago as 1967, the distinguished Judge Henry Friendly of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed the
likelihood of "over-severe admonition" 56 inherent in repetitive
punitive awards: "We have the gravest difficulty in perceiving how
claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity of actions
throughout the nation can be so administered as to avoid overkill."57
This (over)deterrence also comes at a cost, both to the judicial
system and the economy. Repetitive lawsuits for punitive damages
use up a great amount of judicial resources, tying up court time and
personnel. Corporate defendants may also be forced to allocate a
disproportionate amount of financial resources to legal defense and
liability costs instead of to research and development. Further, as
one federal judge observed, the availability of multiple punitive
damages against the same defendant is "the major obstacle to
settlement of mass tort litigation and.., the prompt resolution of the
damage claims of many thousands of injured plaintiffs."58  In
addition to delaying settlement, the perception that earlier awards
against the defendant may be matched or topped drives up settlement
56. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 n.7 (2d Cir.
1967).
57. Id. at 839 (addressing availability of multiple punitive damages awards
in products liability cases).
58. Hon. William W. Schwarzer, Punishment Ad Absurdum, CAL. LAW.
Oct. 1991, at 116. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has also cited Judge
Schwarzer, noting his conclusion that "the potential for punitive awards is a
weighty factor in settlement negotiations and inevitably results in a larger
settlement agreement than would ordinarily be obtained." Dunn v. Hovic, 1
F.3d 1371, 1398 (3d Cir. 1993) (en banc) (Weis, J., dissenting) (citing Asbestos
Litigation Crisis in Federal and State Court: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 132-133 (1992) (statement of Hon. William W.
Schwarzer)), modified, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 1993).
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costs.
59
Multiple punitive damages are unfair to both plaintiffs and
defendants. The problem for plaintiffs can be readily seen in the
mass tort context, where multiple punitive damage awards
effectively transform the judicial system into a legal lottery. The
repeated award of windfall punitive damages to earlier-filing
plaintiffs "imperils [a defendant's] ability to pay compensatory
claims [to future claimants] and its corporate existence." 0  When
companies are forced into bankruptcy by multiple punitive awards,
individual future plaintiffs receive less or no compensation, and
entire communities are affected. 61  As for defendants, courts and
59. For example, consider reactions to the $1 billion-plus verdict in the first
primary pulmonary hypertension ("PPH") case to go to trial in the fen-phen
litigation. Coffey v. Wyeth, No. E-167-334 (Jefferson County Dist. Ct. Apr.
27, 2004). The award included $900 million in punitive damages and was
handed down by a Jefferson County, Texas jury in April 2004. (The case is
currently on appeal.) Peter Kraus, a lawyer at Waters & Kraus in Dallas, stated
"There's no question that [the $1.013 billion award] will have an impact on
what plaintiffs' lawyers are willing to take, and it's going to embolden more
plaintiffs' lawyers to try more of those cases." Reed Abelson & Jonathan D.
Glater, A Texas Jury Rules Against A Diet Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2004, at
C1. Tommy Fibich, a Houston plaintiffs' lawyer, echoed that sentiment: "I've
got... a PPH case and clearly this verdict has made me think it was worth
more than it was yesterday." Brenda Sapino Jeffrey, $1.01 Bil. Fen-Phen
Verdict Faces Cap, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 4, 2004, at 4.
60. Edwards v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 911 F.2d 1151, 1155 (5th
Cir. 1990); see also Bishop v. Gen. Motors Corp., 925 F. Supp. 294, 298
(D.N.J. 1996) ("Indeed, one of the many cogent criticisms of punitive damages
is that multiple punitive liability can both bankrupt a defendant and preclude
recovery for tardy plaintiffs.").
61. As of Jan. 11, 2005, at least 74 companies had sought Chapter 11
protection as a result of asbestos litigation. The Fairness in Asbestos Injury
Resolution Act: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary (2005)
(statement of Mr. Craig Berrington, General Counsel, American Insurance
Association), 2005 WL 61512. The impact of these bankruptcies is well-
documented. The National Economic Research Associates found that workers,
communities, and taxpayers will bear as much as $2 billion in additional costs
due to indirect and induced impacts of company closings related to asbestos.
See JESSE DAVID, THE SECONDARY IMPACTS OF ASBESTOS LIABILITIES (U.S.
Chamber of Comm. ed., 1993), at http://www.nera.com/image/5832.pdf (last
visited June 10, 2005). Additional costs that were brought upon workers and
communities include up to $76 million in worker retraining, $30 million in
increased healthcare costs, and $80 million in payment of unemployment
benefits. Id. Moreover, for every ten jobs lost at a company from an asbestos
bankruptcy, the community can lose eight from the "spillover effect." Jerry A.
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commentators have acknowledged for years that the assessment of
multiple punitive damages at some point becomes fundamentally
unfair and raises serious due process concerns.
62
The bottom line is that for the questionable benefit to society
that multiple punitive damages offer, their adverse impact on our
civil justice system is simply too high.
Hodge, Editorial, Leveling the Playing Field Comprehensive Solution to
Asbestos Cases Needed, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, May 31, 2004, at 5A, 2004
WLNR 1199487.
62. See Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1064 (D.N.J.
1989) ("[T]he court holds that due process places a limit on the number of
times and the extent to which a defendant may be subjected to punishment for
a single course of conduct. Regardless of whether a sanction is labelled [sic]
'civil' or 'criminal' in nature, it cannot be tolerated under the requirements of
due process if it amounts to unrestricted punishment"), vacated in part, 718 F.
Supp. 1233 (D.N.J. 1989), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. Juzwin v.
Asbestos Corp., 900 F.2d 686 (3d Cir. 1990); In re N. Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon
Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 899 (N.D. Cal. 1981)
(explaining that "[a] defendant has a due process right to be protected against
unlimited multiple punishment for the same act"), vacated on other grounds,
693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982); Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 398 (2d
Cir. 1989) (stating that "the multiple imposition of punitive damages for the
same course of conduct may raise serious constitutional concerns, in the
absence of any limiting principle"); In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175,
1188 (8th Cir.) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (asserting that unlimited punishment
for one course of conduct "would violate the sense of 'fundamental fairness'
that is essential to constitutional due process"); Magallanes v. Super. Ct., 167
Cal. App. 3d 878, 889 (1985) (explaining that "[i]t is also fair to ask whether a
defendant who has been punished with punitive damages when the first case is
tried should be punished again when the second, or the tenth, or the hundredth
case is tried"); King v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 906 F.2d 1022, 1031
(stating that "a strong arguable basis exists for applying the due process
clause ... to a jury's award of punitive damages in a mass tort context");
McBride v. Gen. Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1570 (M.D. Ga. 1990)
(explaining that "due process may place a limit on the number of times and the
extent to which a defendant may be subjected to punishment for a single course
of conduct"); David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions,
Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 394 (1994) (observing that the
issue of multiple punitive damage awards "is a problem of enormous
complexity which requires much analysis and ingenuity"); Victor E. Schwartz
& Liberty Magarian, Multiple Punitive Damage Awards in Mass Disaster and
Product Liability Litigation: An Assault on Due Process, 8 ADELPHIA L. J. 101
(1992); Dennis Neil Jones, S. Brett Sutton & Barbara D. Greenwald, Multiple
Punitive Damages Awards for a Single Course of Wrongful Conduct: The Need
for a National Policy to Protect Due Process, 43 ALA. L. REV. 1 (1991); John
Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages,
72 VA. L. REV. 139 (1986).
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3. Class Actions
In 2001, The Washington Post termed class actions the
"mess[iest]" part of the U.S. civil justice system.63 Class actions
were intended to promote efficiency by allowing courts and
defendants to focus their energies on resolving all similar claims in
one lawsuit. 64 Over time, class actions have become the equivalent
of high-stakes litigation poker. The potential costs of losing often
force companies to fold their hands and settle rather than call the
plaintiffs' lawyer's bluff.
Class actions flooded the courts in the 1990s.65 A survey of
Fortune 500 companies found that from 1988 to 1998, the number of
class action filings against them increased by 338% in federal
courts. 66 During that same period, that number increased by more
than 1,000% in state courts, reflecting the belief that plaintiffs are
more likely to obtain and prevail on questionable class actions in
state courts. 67 This trend was fueled in part by the availability of
63. Editorial, Actions Without Class, WASH. POST., Aug. 27, 2001, at A14
("No portion of the American civil justice system is more of a mess than the
world of class actions."). Shortly before this Article went to press, Congress
enacted the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 to reform class action abuse.
Pub. L. 109-2, 114 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711-1715). The
Act is discussed infra in text accompanying notes 78-82.
64. See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Rochelle Tedesco,
Addressing the "Elephant Mass" of Asbestos Cases: Consolidation Versus
Inactive Dockets (Pleural Registries) and Case Management Plans that Deter
Claims by the Non-Sick, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 271, 280-81 (2004) (discussing the
history of consolidating asbestos cases to promote efficiency).
65. See Federalist Soc'y, Analysis: Class Action Litigation-A Federalist
Society Survey, 1 CLASS ACTION WATCH, at http://www.fed-soc.org/
Publications/classactionwatch/volume 1 issue l.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2005);
DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE RAND STUDY OF
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 15 (1997).
66. See Federalist Soc'y, supra note 65.
67. See id.; see also John Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, The Class
Action Fairness Act: Cleaning Up the Class Action Mess, 6 CLASS ACTION
LiTIG. REP. 104, 108 (2005) [hereinafter Beisner & Miller] (noting "the
embarrassing state of class action litigation in this country and the growth of
magnet state courts that rubber stamp anti-consumer class action settlements");
Class Action Lawsuits: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary
(2003) (statement of Assistant Attorney General Viet Dinh of the Office of
Legal Policy of the U.S. Justice Department) (acknowledging "the sort of local
biases that have resulted from State court class actions that often award higher
settlements to in-State victims and award excessive damages against out-of-
State defendants.") available at 2003 WL 21130259.
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large contingency fees and a change in court rules that now
automatically includes people in a class action unless they
affirmatively opt out.68 The latter allows potentially thousands of
plaintiffs to be conscripted into class actions unknowingly.
69
Granting class certification can unfairly skew the outcome of a
case. Class action filings attract litigants in staggering numbers,
70
and evidence indicates that the aggregation of claims increases both
the likelihood that a defendant will be found liable and the size of
any damages award that may result.71 Even where an adverse verdict
is improbable, "the risk of participating in a single trial [of all
claims] and facing a once and for all verdict is ordinarily intolerable"
to defendants. 72 As Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals observed, certification of a class action forces
defendants "to stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury
trial, or be forced by the fear of bankruptcy to settle even if they have
68. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work
of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure(I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 382-386, 393 (1967) (discussing practice
of intervention by individual interested parties in actions under former Rule 23,
and explaining that new "opt out" provision of 23(c)(2) in 1966 amendments
"makes clear that the judgment in any class action maintained as such extends
to the class (excluding opters-out in (b)(3) cases), whether or not favorable to
the class.... It is implicit in what has been said that the anomaly of a class
action covering only the particular parties does not survive under the new
rule.").
69. Trial Judge W. Douglas Baird, who serves in Pinellas County, Florida,
commented that an action in which attorneys recover fees, and plaintiffs
recover nothing is "the class litigation equivalent of the 'squeegee boys' who
used to frequent major urban intersections and who would run up to a
stopped car, splash soapy water on its perfectly clean windshield and expect
payment for the uninvited service of wiping it off." Jason Hoppin, Florida
Judge Compares Milberg Weiss Action to Squeegee Boy, THE RECORDER,
Apr. 16, 2002, http://www.law.com/jsp/statearchive.jsp?type=Article&oldid=
ZZZU1WV940D (last visited June 17, 2005).
70. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 165 (2d
Cir. 1987) (stating that "[t]he drum-beating that accompanies a well-publicized
class action... may well attract excessive numbers of plaintiffs with weak to
fanciful cases").
71. Barry F. McNeil & Beth L. Fancsali, Mass Torts and Class Actions:
Facing Increased Scrutiny, 167 F.R.D. 483, 491 (1996); Kenneth S. Bordens &
Irwin A. Horowitz, Mass Tort Civil Litigation: The Impact of Procedural
Changes on Jury Decisions, 73 JUDICATURE 22 (1989).
72. McNeil & Fancsali, supra note 71, at 490.
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no legal liability." 73  Other courts have characterized these
settlements as "judicial blackmail ' 74 and legalized blackmail. 75
Class certification also can lead to unfair treatment of plaintiffs.
Class counsel, not their clients, call the shots; class members with
more serious and complex claims may be simply "lumped into" the
class and not given the individualized attention needed to fully
adjudicate their claims. 76  Until recently, the legitimacy of class
actions and the merits of class action settlements were rarely
scrutinized. Class actions widely resulted in "coupon settlements,"
in which the plaintiffs received coupons for products or services
rather than cash awards while their lawyers received cash fees, often
in the millions of dollars.
77
73. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995).
Judge Posner also characterized the resulting settlements as the consequence of
"intense pressure to settle," that is, defendants would rather settle outstanding
claims than roll the dice and risk billions of dollars in liability. Id. at 1298.
Judge Posner noted that the federal appeals Judge Henry Friendly, "who was
not given to hyperbole, called settlements induced by a small probability of an
immense judgment in a class action "'blackmail settlements."' Id. (quoting
HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973)).
74. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996).
75. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,
55 F.3d 768, 784 (3d Cir. 1995).
76. See The Class Action Fairness Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 353 Before
the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 10 (1999) (testimony of John H. Beisner, Esq.),
available at 1999 WL 27320.
77. See e.g., Ameet Sachdev, Coupon Awards Reward Whom? Class-Action
Settlements That Pay Lawyers Millions of Dollars and Give Plaintiffs Coupons
that are Sometimes Useless Are Drawing Ire in Congress and Some Courts,
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 29, 2004 (discussing a lawsuit against the maker of Cheerios
cereal that netted lawyers $1.75 million in fees while consumers received
coupons for a free box of Cheerios, but only if they kept their grocery receipt
to prove their previous purchase), 2004 WLNR 17854235; Marguerite Higgins,
Class Members Get Little in Suits, WASH. TIMES, July 2, 2004 (discussing a
lawsuit against Poland Spring for sales of allegedly impure bottle water netted
lawyers $1.35 million and consumers coupons for more of the bottled water),
2004 WLNR 811926; Jim Burke, Carnival Settles Lawsuit, BOSTON HERALD,
Apr. 1, 2001 (class counsel to receive up to $5 million for work in lawsuit
alleging inflated port charges while class members will receive coupons worth
$25 to $55 off a future cruise), 2001 WLNR 280506; see also Victor E.
Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Leah Lorber, Federal Courts Should Decide
Interstate Class Actions: A Call for Federal Class Action Diversity
Jurisdiction Reform, 37 HARV. J. LEGIs. 483 (2000) (detailing abuse of coupon
settlement class action suits).
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Congress and President George W. Bush acted in February 2005
to curb coupon settlements and other class action abuses by enacting
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"). President Bush
signed the CAFA into law on February 18, 2005. The Act has two
main parts. First, it sets forth a Consumer Class Action Bill of
Rights to protect class members from abusive settlements in class
actions that were filed in or have been removed to federal court.
78
Under this provision, contingency fees in coupon settlements are to
be based on the value of coupons actually redeemed, rather than, as
has been common, the total value of the coupons awarded.79 In other
words, if the settlement provided for $5 million in coupons but only
20% of class members actually redeemed the coupons, the lawyers'
fees would be based on a recovery of $1 million, not $5 million.
80
Otherwise, the attorneys' fees must be based on the amount of time
class counsel spent working on the lawsuit.8 1  Second, the Act
expands federal diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction over class
actions to allow federal courts to hear large, interstate class actions.
82
4. Contingency Fees
Contingency fees are intended to help plaintiffs with legitimate
claims obtain legal counsel when they cannot afford to do so
otherwise.8 3 Such fees also are intended to protect the integrity of
the civil justice system by ensuring that lawyers only take credible
cases with a chance of success and diminish potential conflicts of
interest between plaintiffs and their lawyers. 84 In practice, however,
78. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2 § 3, 114 Stat. 4
(2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711-15).
79. Id. (discussing attorneys' fees in coupon settlement cases).
80. Beisner & Miller, supra note 67, at 104.
81. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.
82. Id. at § 4 (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1335(a)(1), 1603(b)(3)) & § 5
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1453); Beisner & Miller, supra note 67, at 108.
83. See, e.g., CTR. FOR LEGAL POLICY AT THE MANHATTAN INST.,
EXCESSIVE LEGAL FEES: PROTECTING UNSOPHISTICATED CONSUMERS, CLASS
ACTION MEMBERS, AND TAXPAYERS 4 (2000) (quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo
Law School Professor Lester Brickman as stating that in some cases, "[t]he
financial incentive for bringing contingency fee claims overwhelms all
fiduciary, ethical, and public policy considerations").
84. See Lance M. Sears, Contingency Fees Allow Greater Access to Courts,
ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Aug. 7, 1989 (explaining that "[t]he more the lawyer can
obtain, either by settlement or verdict, the more the client receives"), available
at http://www.searsswanson.com/CONTINGENCYFEESALLOW.shtml (last
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contingency fees have done the opposite.8 5 The seductive nature of
gargantuan contingency fees contributes to the legal system's
inefficiency, delay, and unfairness.
First, contingency fees provide plaintiffs' lawyers with a
perverse incentive to file speculative claims specifically to obtain
quick settlements, either "nuisance settlements" with small
businesses who can little afford to pay for a protracted legal fight, or
"blackmail settlements" with large companies facing onerous and
expensive litigation. Similarly, the contingency fee system
encourages efforts to obtain huge punitive damages and pain and
suffering awards. Next, contingency fees encourage plaintiffs'
lawyers to file claims that go far beyond existing theories of law-a
phenomenon dubbed "regulation through litigation" by former
Clinton Administration Labor Secretary Robert Reich, because the
suits use the threat of high-stakes litigation to force industries to
change their practices.
86
Plaintiffs' lawyers suggest that large contingency fee
arrangements-from 30% to 50% of all recoveries plus costs-are
necessary because the lawyers heavily invest their own resources up
front despite the risk that they may lose the litigation and recover
nothing.87 This is a myth. It is well-documented that trial lawyers
and special-interest groups use cost-sharing techniques, such as
sharing complaints, pleadings, discovery documents, and settlement
agreements to lower the costs of taking on individual cases. 88 For
example, Business Week reported that for $145, contingency fee
attorneys can buy a 689-page litigation packet that includes step-by-
step instructions for tire tread separation litigation-including
visited June 17, 2005).
85. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Consumer Protection in the Legal
Marketplace: A Legal Consumer's Bill of Rights is Needed, 15 LoY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 1 (2002).
86. Robert B. Reich, Regulation is Out, Litigation is In, USA TODAY, Feb.
11, 1999.
87. The standard fee is one-third of the settlement or verdict, and plaintiffs
additionally reimburse their counsel for legal costs. See Herbert Kritzer, The
Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47 DEPAUL L.
REV. 267, 285-86 (1998). Contingency fees in some states, such as
Oklahoma, may constitute as much as 50% of the net recovery. OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, § 7 (West 2001).
88. Mike France, The Litigation Machine, BUS. WEEK, Jan. 29, 2001,
http://www.businessweek.com/archives/2001/b3717001.arc.htm.
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previously filed complaints and a list of documents to request from
the defendants. 89 Comparable litigation packets are available for
products ranging from handguns to pharmaceuticals.
90
Similarly, the American Bar Association Journal has reported
that high-profile plaintiffs' lawyers structure tort litigation like a
"joint venture," allocating work to different plaintiffs' firms around
the country to lower the upfront costs per firm and avoid
"duplication of effort." 91 The judge presiding over the 1990s Dalkon
Shield litigation noted that "fees, in many instances, exceed
$100,000.00 per claim" and some counsel with hundreds of cases
receive "several million dollars per attorney or law firm." 92 What's
more, as the judge observed, "[g]enerally, the sole efforts related to
such compensation consist of garnering medical records and advising
a client whether to accept a non-negotiable settlement offer.,
9 3
Moreover, it is questionable why clients with strong cases
should subsidize those with weak cases. Many attorneys charge the
same percentage fee for all of their cases, regardless of the
"contingency" involved or the amount of time that will be spent on
the case.94 As former Harvard President and Law School Dean
Derek Bok observed, "rare [are] the lawyer[s] who will inform [their
clients] (and agree to a lower percentage of the take) when they
happen to have an extremely high probability of winning." 95 Legal
ethicist Lester Brickman, a professor at Benjamin N. Cardozo School
of Law, put it this way:
Lawyers have erected toll booths across the courthouse
steps, exacting not a fee for passage but a percentage of all
business transacted upon traversal.... Contingent fee
89. Id.
90. Id.; Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of Am., New and Updated Litigation
Packets (listing examples of litigation packets available), at http://www.
atlanet.org/LegalResearchServices/Tier3/LitigationPackets.aspx (last visited
June 10, 2005).
91. Steven Keeva, No Deficit of Attention Here: Ritalin Class Action Suits
Are Making Some Drug Companies Hyper, A.B.A. J., June 2001, at 28, 30.
92. In re A.H. Robins Co., 182 B.R. 128, 137 n.10 (E.D. Va.), af'd, 86
F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1995).
93. Id.
94. See Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet
Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 74 (1989).
95. DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT: How EXECUTIVES AND
PROFESSIONALS ARE PAID AND How IT AFFECTS AMERICA 140 (1993).
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setting today operates in a milieu substantially devoid of
fiduciary oversight. Overcharging clients is routine and
typically unquestioned, especially when the client is
unaware of the degree to which it has occurred. So
pervasive are these abuses that one may legitimately
describe the current regulatory scheme as rotten.
96
According to one New York attorney, "[s]o engrained and
unexamined is the notion of the one-third contingency fee that it has
taken on the character of natural law."
97
Part of the problem is that most personal injury victims and their
families lack the background and experience to decide whether the
fee arrangement presented to them is fair and reasonable under the
circumstances. In addition, they are likely preoccupied with other
issues, such as the need to cover hospital bills or lost wages, or the
emotional and physical effects of injuries to themselves or family
members.98 This creates unequal bargaining power between clients
96. Brickman, supra note 94, at 127-28.
97. Harold Reynolds, Rot at the Bottom, N.Y. L. J., Oct. 25, 1999, at 2.
98. E.g., Rohan v. Rosenblatt, No. CV 930116887S, 1999 WL 643501, at
* 1 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (finding that a lawyer had pressured a client into
entering a one-third contingency fee agreement while the plaintiff "was
distraught over his wife's death and under the care of a psychologist [and]
worried about paying the funeral bill and saving his house from foreclosure");
John Masson, Lawyer's Troll for Accident Reports Raises Brows,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June 4, 2001, at Al (reporting that a personal injury
lawyer in Bloomington, Indiana wrote to every police and sheriff's department
in the state, asking them to begin automatically faxing him copies of each and
every traffic accident report so that he could immediately solicit potential
clients), available at LEXIS, News Library, Indyst file; Bruce Schultz,
"Runners" Fill Legal Coffers, Negative Image of Lawyers, BATON ROUGE
ADVOC., Nov. 20, 2000, at 1A (reporting that some law firms use paid
"runners" to recruit new clients, some of whom have received payments
totaling over $450,000 per year), available at LEXIS, News Library, Advoct
file; Garry Mitchell, Bar Scrutinizing Lawyer Ads, Solicitations, MOBILE REG.
(Ala.), Dec. 18, 1993, at A l (reporting that after a passenger train derailment in
Alabama, a Louisiana attorney signed up a Mexican train passenger, who
spoke no English, at his hospital bedside); Robert Stowe England, Congress,
Nader, and the Ambulance Chasers, AM. SPECTATOR, Sept. 1990, at 18
(reporting reported "hordes of lawyers bidding on clients offering grief-
stricken families trailers, vans, and new homes if they would sign contingency
fee contracts" after the worst school bus accident in Texas history); William
Grady, Bill Crawford & John O'Brien, Injury Lawyer's Ad Stirs Ire in Indiana,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 26, 1993 (stating that witnesses reported seeing lawyers'
business cards being passed around and the injured being videotaped as they
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and their lawyers. 99 Reforms to protect legal consumers have been
discussed and should be enacted. 100
United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
perhaps summed it up best when she said that contingency fees
"have made more overnight millionaires than almost any other
businesses and the perverse incentives and the untoward
consequences they are creating within our profession are many."'
0'1
were removed on stretchers after a two commuter trains collided in Gary,
Indiana), available at LEXIS, News Library, Chtrib file.
99. See, e.g., In re Shaw, 775 A.2d 1123 (D.C. 2001) (per curiam)
(recognizing a violation of the District of Columbia's ethical rules when an
attorney took $800 of a $2,500 uncontested insurance personal injury
protection payment); Rohan, 1999 WL 643501 (finding that an attorney who
wanted to remodel his office misled the client into believing that his claim
would require "horrendous" litigation and charged a one-third contingency fee
on a $100,000 uncontested settlement when the attorney did no more than
twenty-five hours of work); Iowa Super. Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v.
Hoffinan, 572 N.W.2d 904, 908-09 (Iowa 1997) (suspending an attorney for
six months after he attempted to assess a 33% fee on his client's workers'
compensation recovery, which amounted to over $37,000 for only twenty
hours of work on a recovery that did not reflect the attorney's efforts); White v.
McBride, 937 S.W.2d 796, 799 (Tenn. 1996) (finding that a one-third
contingency fee charged by an attorney in a probate matter was clearly
excessive when "the only genuine contingency involved was how large a
disbursement [the client] would ultimately receive by operation of law"); Att'y
Grievance Comm'n v. Korotki, 569 A.2d 1224, 1226-29 (Md. 1990)
(suspending an attorney who pressured firefighters severely injured in the line
of duty to sign contingency fee contracts reaching 75% of recovery); Att'y
Grievance Comm'n v. Kemp, 496 A.2d 672, 675 (Md. 1985) (ruling that an
attorney may not charge more than a minimal fee for processing an
uncontested personal injury protection claim). One particularly disgraceful
example occurred in 1996 when a medical malpractice settlement did not leave
the comatose client's estate with enough money to pay for her funeral.
Meanwhile, her lawyers walked away with $2.4 million in fees. See Tricia
Renaud, Bar Goes After Savannah Duo's Fee and Maybe Their Licenses,
FULTON CTY. DAILY REP., Jan. 5, 1998, at 1, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Fulton file.
100. See infra Part III.B. 1.
101. Fox News, O'Connor, in Speech, Blasts Death Penalty, Lawyer Fees
and Zero Tolerance (July 3, 2001) (also quoting Justice O'Connor as stating
that some lawyers act as "business partners of plaintiffs in seeking large-dollar
recoveries rather than act as objective servants of the law."),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,28675,00.html (last visited June 10,
2005).
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B. Trend 2: The Growing Disconnect Between
Liability Costs and Fault
When the cost to a defendant is not related to the alleged
misconduct, the transfer mechanism of the tort system fails. Often,
innocent sellers are named as defendants simply to provide a vehicle
for suing others with deeper pockets. The plaintiff never intends to
enforce a judgment against that seller. Nevertheless, the defendant
must bear the cost of a legal defense and the fallout from litigation.
Furthermore, under the laws in many states, a defendant that is only
minimally at fault for an incident can be forced to pay a share of
compensation that is significantly disproportionate to its fault.
1. Innocent Sellers
Under the common law in most states, all members of the chain
of distribution of a defective product may be held responsible for
resulting injuries, even non-manufacturing sellers who know nothing
about the design or manufacture of a product, have no way to
identify the problem, and have no way of curing any defects that may
exist.102 The rationale for the rule "is that between an innocent
manufacturer and an injured consumer, public policy functions
against placing the burden on a consumer who might not otherwise
receive compensation for his or her injury.' 10 3 Imposing liability
against such sellers is reasonable in certain circumstances, such as
102. See Robert A. Sachs, Product Liability Reform and Seller Liability: A
Proposal for Change, 55 BAYLOR L. REv. 1031, 1032 (2003); see
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, THIRD: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (1998) (stating that
"[olne engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products
who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to
persons or property caused by the defect."). Liability for product defects under
the RESTATEMENT, THIRD applies to "all commercial sellers and distributors of
products, including nonmanufacturing sellers and distributors such as
wholesalers and retailers" and exists "even when such nonmanufacturing
sellers or distributors do not themselves render the products defective and
regardless of whether they are in a position to prevent defects from occurring."
Id. cmt. e.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)
(imposing liability on "one who sells any product in a defective condition" if
the seller was engaged in the business of selling such a product and the product
was expected to, and did, reach the user or consumer without substantial
change).
103. David W. Clark, Life in Lawsuit Central: An Overview of the Unique
Aspects ofMississippi 's Civil Justice System, 71 MIss. L. J. 359, 390 (2001).
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when the manufacturer is insolvent or otherwise cannot provide
compensation to the plaintiff,104 but a blanket rule is extremely unfair
to innocent sellers and provides opportunities for abuse of the civil
justice system. 105 Plaintiffs' lawyers frequently manipulate this rule
to defeat federal diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction over claims that
should be heard in federal court and allow the case to be heard in a
venue of their choosing.l16
As a result, small business owners may be subject to numerous
lawsuits and thousands of dollars in legal costs even though these
innocent sellers bore no responsibility for the injury, but simply
participated in the stream of commerce by selling a product that
became the subject of a lawsuit. In fact, local retailers rarely pay
damages; the product manufacturer is held responsible for the harm
in more than 95% of cases where liability is present. 10 7  "Even
though sellers may ultimately receive indemnification, involving the
seller in litigation generates substantial and unnecessary legal costs,
which are ultimately passed on to... consumers in the form of a
"'tort tax.'" 0 8
One small business, the Bankston Drug Store in Jefferson
County, Mississippi, which was the only pharmacy in that county,
became known as "ground zero" in pharmaceutical litigation because
it was named as a defendant in numerous lawsuits targeting out-of-
state pharmaceutical companies. 1°9  The owner of the store,
pharmacist Traci Swilley, has said: "My lawyers tell me that we're
only sued because they want to stay in Jefferson County because the
verdicts are so high. '" 110  In response to these problems, the
104. Sachs, supra note 102, at 1105-11 (discussing situations in which
holding a seller liable may be justified).
105. See Clark, supra note 103, at 390-91.
106. Id. at 391.
107. Id. at 390.
108. Id. at 391.
109. See Jerry Mitchell, Jefferson County Ground Zero for Cases, CLARION-
LEDGER (Miss.), June 17, 2001, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Clledg file.
110. Mark Ballard, Mississippi Becomes a Mecca for Tort Suits, NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 30, 2001, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, Ntlawj file. The
former owner of the store, Hilda Bankston, explained the adverse impact the
litigation had on her business:
I've searched record after record and made copy after copy for use
against me.... I've had to hire personnel to watch the store while I
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Mississippi Legislature"' joined twenty-three other states in enacting
innocent seller statutes that limit the imposition of liability on non-
manufacturing sellers. "1
2
2. Joint and Several Liability
Joint liability, also known as joint and several liability, provides
that when two or more persons engage in conduct that might subject
them to individual liability and their conduct produces a single,
indivisible injury, each defendant may be liable for the total amount
of damages." 13 The idea is that each defendant's wrongful conduct
contributed to the plaintiff's injury, so the plaintiff should be fully
compensated and should not suffer if one defendant is absent from
the jurisdiction or insolvent. Over the past two decades, the
shortcomings of joint liability rules have become increasingly
apparent: A defendant only minimally at fault bears a
disproportionate and unfair burden.
The plaintiffs' lawyer strategy for litigation, then, is to find a
large corporation, hospital, or other "deep pocket" defendant that
was dragged into court on numerous occasions to testify. I have
endured the whispers and questions of my customers and neighbors
wondering what we did to end up in court so often. And I have spent
many sleepless nights wondering if my business would survive the
tidal wave of lawsuits cresting over it.
Class Action Litigation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. (July 31, 2002) (statement of Hilda Bankston).
111. H.B. 13, 1 st Spec. Sess. (Miss. 2004) (signed by Gov. Barbour on June
16, 2004).
112. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-402 (amended 2003); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 18, § 7001 (2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 5 1-1-11.1 (West 2004); IDAHO CODE
§ 6-1407 (Michie 2004); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-621 (West 2004);
IND. CODE ANN § 34-20-3-1 (2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.18 (West 2004);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3306 (2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.340 (Michie
2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.52-.53 (West 2004); MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-405 (2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2947(6) (2004);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544.41 (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 1 1-1-63 (Supp.
2004); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.762 (West Supp. 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-21,181 (Lexis 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-9 (West 200 & Supp.
2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99B-2 (Lexis 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §
28-01.3-04, 05 (Michie Supp. 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.78
(Anderson 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-9 (Michie 1995); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-28-106 (Vernon 2000); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.003
(Vernon Supp. 2004-2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.040 (West 2001).
113. See, e.g., Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197, 204 (Ill. 1983)
(describing the traditional common law doctrine of joint and several liability).
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arguably can be joined in an action. Further, the jury rarely is
informed of the effects of joint liability. 1 4 As a result, the jury may
believe a "defendant will only be liable for a small contribution to
the total damage award and the main defendant will be liable for the
remainder." 1 5 What the unsuspecting jury does not realize is that
"[i]n reality, this deep pocket defendant may be liable for the entire
award, with little hope of contribution from the party that is mainly
at fault."'' 6
For this reason, a majority of states have abolished or modified
the traditional doctrine of joint liability."17  Eighteen states have
abolished joint liability and replaced it with pure several liability,
under which each defendant is liable for its proportionate share of
fault for the harm. 118 Four states have eliminated joint liability for
114. Often, courts do not inform juries that holding a minor defendant even
1% at fault could result in that defendant becoming responsible for 100% of
the judgment. See Luna v. Shockey Sheet Metal & Welding Co., 743 P.2d 61,
64 (Idaho 1987); see also, e.g., Kaeo v. Davis, 719 P.2d 387, 395-96 (Haw.
1986) (holding that the trial court should inform the jury of the possible legal
consequences of joint and several liability); Reese v. Werts Corp., 379 N.W.2d
I (Iowa 1985) (holding that the trial court should have instructed the jury on
the effects of its verdict on the plaintiffs recovery); DeCelles v. State, 795
P.2d 419, 421 (Mont. 1990) (stating "[w]e think Montana juries can and should
be trusted with the information about the consequences of their verdict");
Coryell v. Town of Pinedale, 745 P.2d 883, 884, 886 (Wyo. 1987) (holding
that a state statute provided that the court must "inform the jury of the
consequences of its verdict"); see generally Jordan H. Leibman, Robert B.
Bennett, Jr. & Richard Fetter, The Effects of Lifting the Blindfold from Civil
Juries Charged with Apportioning Damages in Modified Comparative Fault
Cases: An Empirical Study of the Alternatives, 35 AM. Bus. L.J. 349, 350-55
(1998) (comparing "blindfold rules" with "sunshine rules"). There are,
however, a number of courts with "sunshine rules" that believe that"answer[ing] 'factual' questions.., in ignorance of the answers' consequences
can produce arbitrary, inequitable, and unintended results." Id. at 350. These
courts put their faith in a jury's ability to act responsibly and understand the
way the law operates. See id. at 566-70.
115. Julie K. Weaver, Jury Instructions on Joint and Several Liability in
Washington State, 67 WASH. L. REv. 457, 471 (1992).
116. Id.
117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY
§ 17 cmt. a (2000) (surveying state joint liability laws).
118. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080 (Michie 2004); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-2506 (West 2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-201 (Michie Supp. 2003);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5 (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-33 (as
modified by 5.B.3, signed by Gov. Perdue on Feb. 17, 2005); IDAHO CODE § 6-
803 (Michie 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-2-8 (Michie 1998); Brown v.
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noneconomic damages. 19  Fourteen states have abolished joint
liability in cases where the defendant's comparative responsibility is
below some threshold level. 120 Some states provide other limits on
Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 868 (Kan. 1978) (holding that "the concept of joint and
several liability between joint tortfeasors... no longer applies in comparative
negligence actions"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182 (Michie 1992 & Supp.
2004); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1804 (West 1987); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts.
2323-2324 (West 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.6304(4), 600.6312
(2001) (exempting certain medical malpractice claims and criminal conduct
involving gross negligence or the use of alcohol or drugs); MISS. CODE ANN. §
85-5-7 (1972 & Supp. 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1 (Michie 1996)
(exempting strict liability cases, cases involving vicarious liability, or
"situations not covered by any of the foregoing and having a sound basis in
public policy"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (1996); Anderson v.
O'Donohue, 677 P.2d 648 (Okla. 1983) (joint liability abolished if the plaintiff
was at fault); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.610(6)(a) (2003) (exempting cases resulting
from violation of federal or state statute regarding spill, release, or disposal of
hazardous waste); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 58 (Tenn. 1992)
(rendering the doctrine of joint and several liability obsolete); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-27-40 (1953); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (Michie 2003).
119. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1431.2 (Deering 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.4
(West 1998 & Supp. 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-21,185.10 (Lexis
2004) (abolishing joint liability for noneconomic damages in all cases except
conspiracy); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.22 (Anderson 2001 & Supp.
2004); cf N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1601-1602 (McKinney 1997) (abolishing joint
liability for noneconomic damages for defendants less than 50% at fault,
except where defendant acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others in
cases of unlawfully released hazardous substances; and in product liability
actions where the manufacturer of the product is not a party to the action,
where jurisdiction over the manufacturer could not be obtained, and when
liability would have been imposed on the manufacturer through strict liability,
among other statutorily defined exemptions).
120. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81 (West 1997 & Supp. 2005) (setting
forth schedule for application of joint liability based on fault of defendant and
amount of economic damages; joint liability does not apply to any defendant
less at fault than plaintiff); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1117 (West 2003)
(no joint liability in Illinois where defendants are less than 25% at fault); 735
ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2 1118 (West 2003) (stating that defendants are
jointly liable for medical expenses); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.4 (West 1998 &
Supp. 2004) (abolishing joint liability for economic damages for defendants
less than 50% at fault); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.02, Subd. 1 (West 2000 &
Supp. 2005) (abolishing joint liability for defendants less than 50% at fault);
MO. STAT. § 537.067.3 (as modified by H.B. 393, signed by Gov. Blunt on
Mar. 28, 2005) (joint liability abolished for any defendant less than 51% at
fault); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-705(7) (2003) (abolishing joint liability for
defendants less than 50% at fault, except in cases involving an act or omission
that violates a state environmental law governing hazardous or deleterious
substances); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 41.141 (Michie 2002) (abolishing joint
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joint liability. 12 1 Nine states and the District of Columbia have yet to
generally abolish or modify their joint liability rules. 122
and several liability for defendants with less fault than plaintiff, except for
certain actions including those sounding in products liability and strict
liability); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-e (1997) (abolishing joint liability for
defendants less than 50% at fault); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-5.3 (West 2000)
(in general, joint liability has been abolished for defendants less than 60% at
fault; defendants may be held jointly and severally liable for compensatory
damages if fault cannot be apportioned, or a nonsettling tortfeasor is
insolvent); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.22 (Anderson 2001 & Supp. 2004)
(abolishing joint liability for economic damages for defendants less than 50%
at fault); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (West 1998 & Supp. 2004)
(abolishing joint liability for defendants found to be less than 60% at fault);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-15 (as modified by H.B. 3008, signed by Gov.
Sanford on Mar. 21, 2005, and as further modified by S.B. 83, signed by Gov.
Sanford on Apr. 4, 2005) (abolishing joint liability for defendants less than
50% at fault); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.013 (Vernon Supp.
2005); (abolishing joint liability for defendants found to be less than 50% at
fault); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045(1) (West 1997) (abolishing joint liability for
defendants found to be less than 51% at fault).
121. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h (Supp. 2004) (stating that
defendants in negligence actions generally are liable only for their percentage
of fault); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9 (Supp. 2003) (abolishing joint and
several liability except for economic damages in personal injury and wrongful
death actions and noneconomic and economic damages in intentional torts,
strict and products liability torts, cases involving environmental contamination,
toxic torts, and others), MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231B, §§ 1-2 (2000) (stating
that each defendant is liable to the extent of that defendant's pro rata share of
the entire common liability; thus in a two-defendant case, a defendant who is
found to be negligent can be compelled to pay up to 50% of the judgment);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1601, 1602 (McKinney 1997) (abolishing joint liability for
noneconomic damages in certain cases for defendants less than 50% at fault);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 15-8-15.1 (Michie 2001) (limiting joint liability to
two times defendant's percentage of fault for any defendant found to be less
than 50% at fault); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.070 (West 1988 & Supp.
2005) (joint liability abolished except where-plaintiff is faultless, where
defendant conspired to commit tortious activity or is the agent of another, and
in cases involving fungible product or hazardous or solid waste); W.VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-7B-9 (2004) (abolishing joint liability in medical malpractice
actions).
122. The following states generally employ full joint and several liability:
Alabama, H.R.H. Metals, Inc. v. Miller ex rel. Miller, 833 So. 2d 18, 28-29
(Ala. 2002) (Houston, J., concurring specially); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
10, § 6301 (1999); District of Columbia, Berg v. Footer, 673 A.2d 1244, 1247-
48 (D.C. 1996); Maine, Peerless Ins. Co. v. Progressive Ins. Co., 822 A.2d
1125, 1128 (Me. 2003); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-
1401 (2002); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1B-1 (Lexis 2003);
Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-6-2 (1997); Vermont, State v. Therrien,
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3. Peripheral Defendants
Litigation over exposure to asbestos has become the
quintessential example of the plaintiffs' lawyers' strategy of naming
defendants with little responsibility for a particular harm--the so-
called "peripheral defendants."' 123  After roughly thirty years of
lawsuits, virtually all former manufacturers of asbestos-containing
products have been forced into bankruptcy. 124  Now, a new
generation of defendants is becoming ensnarled in the litigation to
make up for the "traditional defendants" that are no longer around to
pay their full share.'
25
These "peripheral defendants" have only an attenuated
connection to asbestos, but are now named in asbestos litigation
because of their "deep pockets"; "the net has spread... to companies
far removed from the scene of any putative wrongdoing."' 6 There
were 300 asbestos defendants in 1982;127 now there are more than
8,500.128 Asbestos litigation now touches firms in industries engaged
830 A.2d 28, 37 (Vt. 2003) (following joint liability doctrine but finding that
specific case does not meet requirement that "to be a joint tortfeasor, one must
be a tortfeasor in relation to the injured party"); Virginia, Sam Finley, Inc. v.
Waddell, 151 S.E.2d 347, 353 (Va. 1966); West Virginia, Strahin v.
Cleavenger, 603 S.E.2d 197, 210-11 (W. Va. 2004).
123. In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 747-48
(E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992).
124. See The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act: Hearing Before the
Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary (2005) (testimony of Craig Berrington, Esq.)
(stating at least 74 companies had filed for bankruptcy), available at 2005 WL
61512.
125. In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 747-48; see also
Richard B. Schmitt, Burning Issue: How Plaintiffs' Lawyers Have Turned
Asbestos Into a Court Perennial, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2001, at Al.
126. Editorial, Lawyers Torch the Economy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2001; see
also Susan Warren, Plaintiffs Target Companies Whose Premises Contained
Any Form of Deadly Material, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2003, at BI; Susan
Warren, Asbestos Suits Target Makers of Wine, Cars, Soups, Soaps, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 12, 2000, at B1; 'Medical Monitoring and Asbestos Litigation'-A
Discussion with Richard Scruggs and Victor Schwartz, 17:3 MEALEY'S LITIG.
REP.: ASBESTOS 39 (Mar. 1, 2002) (noting a remark from Mr. Scruggs that the
litigation has turned into an "endless search for a solvent bystander")
[hereinafter Medical Monitoring].
127. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, VARIATION
IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES 5 (1984).
128. Deborah R. Hensler, California Asbestos Litigation-The Big Picture,
COLUMNS, Aug. 2004, at 5.
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in almost every form of economic activity that takes place in the
economy.' 29 Senior U.S. District Court Judge Jack Weinstein has
said "it is not impossible that every company with even a remote
connection to asbestos may be driven into bankruptcy."' 3 ° In fact,
the process has already accelerated due to the general "piling on"
nature of asbestos liability.' 31 Former U.S. Attorney General Griffin
Bell predicts that half of the companies in the Dow Jones Index may
soon be affected. 1
32
There is something unfair about our civil justice system when it
allows peripheral defendants to be subjected to lawsuits and force
them to settle or face crushing legal liability for personal injuries
simply because the primary defendants are bankrupt and peripheral
defendants have funds available. If the current course continues,
asbestos-related bankruptcies will increase both in number and in
frequency, because many peripheral defendants will be forced to turn
to the bankruptcy courts to resolve their asbestos litigation
problems. 1
33
C. Trend 3: Litigation for Non-compensatory Purposes
As discussed above, the transfer mechanism of the tort system is
to compensate individuals, or make them whole, for injuries caused
by others. 134  Other types of suits, termed "regulation through
litigation" and "follow-on" lawsuits, are not designed to compensate
actual plaintiffs, but rather to use the litigation system to achieve
legislative or regulatory goals. 135 These claims are inefficient and
129. STEPHEN CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS
LITIGATION, at xxv (2005).
130. Hon. Jack Weinstein, Remarks at a Symposium of the Bar Association
of the City of New York, Asbestos: What Went Wrong? (Oct. 21, 2002).
131. See generally Mark D. Plevin & Paul W. Kalish, What's Behind the
Recent Wave of Asbestos Bankruptcies?, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS,
Apr. 20, 2001, at 20.
132. See Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Asbestos Litigation and Judicial Leadership:
The Courts' Duty to Help Solve the Asbestos Litigation Crisis, BRIEFLY, June
2002, at 24.
133. In 2003, more than 100,000 claims were filed, "the most in a single
year." Editorial, The Asbestos Blob, Cont., WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2004, at A16.
134. See supra Part I.
135. For example, Mississippi trial lawyer Richard Scruggs, who filed
massive coordinated lawsuits against health maintenance organizations in
1999, explained that the "millions of men, women and children who were sold
a bill of goods at the expense of their health... have asked us to change this
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unpredictable. Additionally, they unnecessarily duplicate regulatory
actions, can create contrary results, and tie up court resources.
Part of the public policy behind tort law is to let people know
which parties are responsible for preventing or insuring against
potential loss. A predictable civil justice system would allow
companies to shape their conduct according to governing law, put
them on notice as to how much liability they should expect, and
prevent windfall recoveries that push this system out of balance. In
the last couple of decades, the U.S. tort system has become highly
unpredictable, due to inventive trial lawyers and judges who
facilitate "regulation through litigation" and windfall damages
awards. 136
1. "Regulation Through Litigation"
The regulation of business involves public policy judgments that
are assigned to the legislature and sometimes delegated to executive
branch agencies. These agencies can then develop the highly
technical expertise needed to make sensitive risk-benefit decisions
that best serve the public. Regulation through litigation takes place
when public prosecutors, private plaintiffs' attorneys, or alliances
between these two groups seek to use mass litigation to impose their
beliefs about appropriate business behavior on businesses that are
operating in a lawful industry. 137  By forcing industry-wide
behavioral changes through "blackmail settlements"' 138 or multi-
million or billion dollar jury verdicts, a handful of public and private
lawyers can overrule the public policy and regulatory decisions of
Congress, state legislatures, and executive branch regulatory
agencies.
A key problem with regulation through litigation is that the
process of judicial decisionmaking was designed to settle disputes
between parties under traditional tort law, not to set national public
policy agendas. Courts are backward-looking, not forward-looking.
unconscionable system through the courts and that is what we will do." Eddie
Curran, A Class Action Prescription, MOBILE REG. (Ala.), Dec. 30, 1999, at
Al.
136. See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Regulation Through
Litigation Has Just Begun: What You Can Do To Stop It, BRIEFLY, Nov. 1999.
137. Id. at 9-16.
138. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995).
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They make law retroactively, and these changes are supposed to be
incremental. 139 If courts make broad, sweeping changes in the law
retroactively, individuals and businesses cannot provide input into
these changes, do not have notice of these changes, and cannot shape
their behavior to comply with the new law until it is too late.
This type of litigation gained notoriety in the late 1990s during
the state attorneys general lawsuits against the tobacco industry.1
40
In their pleadings, the attorneys general sought to recover state
Medicaid costs for treating illnesses allegedly caused by smoking.'1
4
Under the fundamental principles of tort law, the right of states to
recover for such costs could not be greater than the right of an
individual smoker to sue for his or her own injury. 14 Nevertheless,
some courts believed that the legislative branch had failed to
adequately regulate tobacco and that they were the only public
officials who could make the tobacco industry change its marketing
practices. 143
These judges altered core tort principles to give states greater
rights to sue than individual smokers. First, companies could not
raise defenses based on smoker choice in the state actions.1
44
Second, states would not have to connect an individual's smoking
with an individual's injury. 145 General and often questionable data
would supply that link. Third, states would not have to identify
139. Other problems with the court system's suitability to "regulate" include
the fact that courts have no mechanism to hold public hearings, gather
information from the public at large, or balance the varied interests of all
affected persons, most of whom are not before the court. Courts receive only
limited information submitted by the individual litigants in an attempt to
resolve a narrow dispute. See Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 136, at 1-2.
Also, little public light is shed on court decision making and, in many states,
judges are appointed, not elected. The public has no voice in and must accept
judicial will without recourse at the polls. In those states where judges are
elected, the public is generally unaware of the legal opinions these judges have
written or the impact of their decisions on society. Id. at 2.
140. Id. at 9-12.
141. Id. at 10-12.
142. Id. at 10.
143. Id. at 9-12.
144. See, e.g., Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Assoc. Indus., 678 So. 2d
1239, 1250 (Fla. 1996).
145. See, e.g., id. at 1256 (upholding the validity of Florida's Medicaid
Third-Party Liability Act, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 409.910, which allows the State to
use statistical information to present its case).
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which particular manufacturer caused which particular injury.
146
Faced with "bet the industry" litigation facilitated by these changes
in fundamental tort law, tobacco companies settled.' 47 As a result,
the judges made substantive changes in the way tobacco could be
marketed.
Since the tobacco suits were brought in the 1990s, other
industries have been targets of the regulation through litigation craze,
including firearms manufacturers, 148 companies manufacturing or
selling gasoline with methyl tertiary butyl ether ("MTBE"),
149
pharmaceutical companies,' automobile insurance companies,'
5 1
146. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(9)(b) (1995). But see Agency for
Health Care Admin., 678 So. 2d at 1255-56 (ruling unconstitutional a
provision that allows the simultaneous use of market-share liability and joint
and several liability). Section 409.910(9)(a) & (b) was repealed in 1998. See
1998 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 98-411 (H.B. 3007) (West).
147. The tobacco industry agreed to pay more than $206 billion to the states
over 25 years, revise its advertising and marketing practices, change how it
places products in stores, and fund smoking cessation programs. See Joy
Johnson Wilson, Summary of the Attorneys General Master Tobacco
Settlement Agreement, Tobacco Syllabus, at http://academic.udayton.edu/
health/syllabi/tobacco/summary.htm#Glance (last visited June 10, 2005).
148. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999);
City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98-CH-15596 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook
County, filed Nov. 12, 1998); Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 98-18578
(La. Civ. Dist. Ct. Orleans Parish filed Oct. 30, 1998); City of Boston v. Smith
& Wesson Corp., No. 99-2590 (Mass. Super. Ct. Suffolk County filed June 3,
1999); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. A-9902369 (Ohio Ct.
C.P. Hamilton County filed Apr. 28, 1999), dismissed, No. A9902369, 1999
WL 809838 (Ohio Misc. Oct. 7, 1999).
149. See Announcement of Request from Richard Blumenthal, Conn. Atty.
Gen., for Proposals: Litigation services involving compensatory and
punitive damages and injunctive relief against manufacturers, designers,
refiners, distributors, and sellers of methyl tertiary butyl ether ("MTBE") for
pollution and contamination of the waters of the State of Connecticut, RFP No.
04-01 (MTBE) (Feb. 25, 2004), http://www.cslib.org/attygenl/hottopics/mtbe%
20rfp.pdf.
150. See Announcement of Request from Richard Blumenthal, Conn. Atty.
Gen., for Proposals: Litigation services involving claims for restitution,
injunctive relief and any other relief authorized by law with respect to unfair
and deceptive sales and marketing practices by pharmaceutical companies with
respect to the sale, marketing and reporting of the Average Wholesale Price of
their drugs and which conduct has caused harm to the State of Connecticut and
to consumers, RFP No. 04-02 (Dec. 20, 2004), http://www.cslib.org/attygenl/
hottopics/drugpricinglitigationrfp.pdf; William Hathaway, State Sues Drug
Companies, Claiming Price Gouging, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 14, 2003, at
B7.
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and former manufacturers of lead pigments and lead-based paint.'
1 52
For example, the State of Rhode Island hired private
contingency fee lawyers to pursue a lawsuit against former lead
pigment manufacturers. 53 The suit sought to force them to pay the
abatement costs in all buildings where lead paint is found throughout
the state, regardless of whether the paint is flaking and peeling,
encapsulated or covered over.' 5 4 The suit's goal directly contravenes
legislative decision making about the best way to handle properties
with lead-based paint. In 1991, the Rhode Island General Assembly
enacted the Lead Poisoning Prevention Act, which requires owners
151. In 1999, an Illinois state court effectively set a new nationwide standard
for the insurance industry to meet when repairing automobiles by imposing a
$1.2 billion judgment against State Farm for authorizing the use of generic
crash parts instead of more expensive original equipment manufacturer parts.
Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., No. 97-L-1 14, 1999 WL 1022134, *4
(Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 8, 1999) (unpublished) (disgorgement damages of $130
million reversed, but affirmed in all other respects, by 746 N.E.2d 1242, 1261-
62 (Ill. App. 2001)). This practice was fully disclosed to policyholders and
permitted in all jurisdictions at issue; some states even "required the
availability of generic auto parts to keep costs down." See Victor E. Schwartz
& Leah Lorber, State Farm v. Avery: State Court Regulation Through
Litigation Has Gone Too Far, 33 CONN. L. REv. 1215, 1217 (2001). State
Farm could not have anticipated or taken steps to avoid this verdict, but to
guard against a similar verdict, many insurers only offer their insureds original
manufacturer parts. Joseph B. Treaster, Generic Car Parts Makers Fighting
Back, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2000, at 8C (after the Avery decision came down,
"[s]everal other big auto insurers, facing their own lawsuits, followed State
Farm's lead [of using only OEM parts]."). While the merits of generic parts
are debatable, this should either be a matter of contract between private parties,
or, if safety issues are involved, a matter for regulatory agencies, not judges.
152. See, e.g., State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226, 2001 WL 345830
(R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2001) (unpublished) (addressing defendants' motions
to dismiss claims including causes of action for public nuisance, unfair trade
practices, strict liability, product liability and fraud); Smith v. Lead Indus., 157
Md. App. 713 (May 24, 2004) (No. 2368, Sept. 2002 Term) (unpublished)
(appeal considering whether plaintiffs must establish reliance on
representations by former manufacturers of lead products).
153. At the time this Article was written, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
was considering whether the State violated federal and state constitutional
protections when it entered into a contingency fee contract with private
personal-injury lawyers to pursue public nuisance claims against the former
manufacturers of lead pigments and lead-based paints. State v. Lead Indus.
Ass'n, No. 2004-63-M.P. (R.I. cert. granted Dec. 22, 2004).
154. State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226, 2001 WL 345830 (R.I. Super.
Ct. Apr. 2, 2001) (unpublished).
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of older buildings to maintain them in a "lead-safe" condition. For
example, owners must keep painted surfaces intact so lead paint does
not become a hazard. 155 The Rhode Island Department of Health, in
agreemei't with relevant federal regulatory agencies, asserted that the
removal of well-maintained lead paint creates risks of poisoning
children that otherwise would not exist.' 56 Maryland trial lawyer
Peter Angelos has brought a similar lawsuit on behalf of private
plaintiffs, despite the Maryland Legislature's preference for the
"lead-safe" approach. 1
57
The newest frontier for "regulation through litigation" appears
to be the use of tort lawsuits to address the obesity problem in the
United States. 158 This is a radical departure from the laws governing
the sales of food. Traditionally, sellers of food were among the first
product sellers to be subject to strict liability.159 As a result, if food
155. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-24.6-26 (2005) (legislature's preferred approach is
to keep paint in "lead safe" condition), § 23-24.6-4(15) (effective until July 1,
2008) & 23-24.6-4(12) (2005) (effective July 1, 2008) ("lead-safe" includes
encapsulation and covering of lead-based paint).
156. Rhode Island Dep't of Health, Expanding Childhood Lead Poisoning in
Rhode Island 8xxxii-8xxxiii (Apr. 22, 1994) ("[E]xperience has revealed that
complete lead source removal can be very difficult to achieve in such a way
that significant lead dust exposures are not created. In many cases, the home
environment is made more dangerous by de-leading."); see also Centers for
Disease Control, Managing Elevated Blood Lead Levels Among Young
Children: Recommendations from the Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead
Poisoning Prevention (Mar. 2002) at 21, (reporting on one study of children
that found "on-site paint removal, resulted in increases in children's
[blood lead levels] ... despite a protocol for safe work practices"),
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/CaseManagement/caseManage main.htm; id. at
15 (instructing to "Keep to a minimum on-site removal of intact leaded paint");
see also Lead; Identification of Dangerous Levels of Lead: Final Rule, 66 Fed.
Reg. 1206, 1213 (Jan. 5, 2001) ("Not all lead-based paint is a hazard, only that
paint which EPA determines 'would result' in adverse health effects.")).
157. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. §§ 6-815, 6-801(m)(4) (2004)
(describing hazard reduction standard that does not require that all lead paint
be removed and characterizing units in compliance with that standard as "lead
safe").
158. See Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 32-33 (2003) (testimony of Victor E. Schwartz,
Esq.).
159. See, e.g., Van Bracklin v. Fonda, 12 Johns. 468 (N.Y. 1815); Moses v.
Mead, 1 Denio 378, 387 (N.Y. 1845). For a more extensive discussion of this
topic, see William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1103-10 (1960).
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has a "manufacturing defect," there were, and are, no excuses. 160
Under the Restatement of Torts, Third: Products Liability, if a
reasonable consumer would not expect the food to contain the item,
then the food would be considered defective, e.g., a pebble in a can
of peas or a one-inch chicken bone in a chicken enchilada. 16 1 Sellers
of food also may be subject to liability for failure to warn, such as
neglecting to label that a product has a well-known allergen like
peanuts. 162 Finally, sellers of food could be liable for failure to
conform to applicable safety statutes, for example, by not cooking a
hamburger at more than 160'F if a person was harmed by bacteria
that would have been killed if the hamburger had been properly
heated. 1
63
In recent years, however, suits have been filed against sellers of
food on the premise that food eaten in significant enough quantities
causes harm, particularly obesity and obesity-related health
conditions. 164  The purported class action lawsuit Pelman v.
McDonald's Corporation'65 was filed in New York by clinically
obese children and their parents or guardians. The plaintiffs argued
that their regular consumption of McDonald's foods was a
significant or substantial factor in the development of their obesity,
diabetes, coronary heart disease, high blood pressure, elevated
cholesterol intake, or other adverse diseases or health effects. 1
66
Federal Judge Robert Sweet understood the dynamics involved
and dismissed the claims. 6 7 First, if traditional rules are followed,
the plaintiff would have to show that his or her obesity was caused
160. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, THIRD: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 7 (1998).
161. Id. § 7 cmt. b.
162. Id.
163. See Victor E. Schwartz & Phil S. Goldberg, Closing the Food Court:
Why Legislative Action is Needed to Curb Obesity Lawsuits, BRIEFLY, Aug.
2004, at 6.
164. See Barber v. McDonald's Corp., Compl., No. 23145 (N.Y. Super. Ct.
filed July 24, 2002) (voluntarily withdrawn); Pelman v. McDonald's Corp.,
2003 WL 22052778 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003) (dismissing amended complaint
and denying plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend complaint) (Pelman II);
Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(dismissing original complaint without prejudice) (Pelman I).
165. Pelman I, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 512.
166. Id. at 519.
167. See generally Pelman 11, 2003 WL 22052778; Pelman 1, 237 F. Supp.
2d. at 512.
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by food, not by failure to exercise, other lifestyle choices, or
genetics. 168  Second, the plaintiff would have to show that a
particular defendant's food caused this harm-something that will be
very difficult to establish considering the multiple sources of food
that people consume.' 69 Finally, there would have to be a major
change in the definition of what constitutes a "product defect" for
liability to ensue.1
7 0
Unfortunately, on appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that plaintiffs could pursue their claims that their obesity and
related health problems were caused by McDonald's alleged failure
to disclose its use of certain additives and food processing methods,
and for its alleged failure to provide nutritional information about its
food.' 71 The Second Circuit ruled that under New York's deceptive
trade practices statute, the plaintiffs do not have to show that they
relied on any representations made by the defendant seller.
172
Disagreeing with Judge Sweet, the Second Circuit also ruled that the
plaintiffs did not have to set forth at this stage of the litigation what
other restaurants they patronized or disclose whether they exercised
or had family health histories that could have caused their alleged
injuries. 171
2. Follow-on Lawsuits
"Follow-on lawsuits" have a similar regulatory effect. They
arise when state attorneys general or private plaintiffs' attorneys
piggyback on regulatory activity by filing lawsuits whenever a
company's practices are addressed or subject to investigation by
regulatory agencies. In these instances, the regulatory agencies have
taken corrective action to fix a problem. Often the plaintiffs have not
suffered a real injury and the results of the litigation provide
practically no benefit for consumers. As part of resulting
settlements, however, the state or private lawyers can secure millions
of dollars in additional fines and attorney fees. Moreover, they can
168. Pelman 11, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 539.
169. See id. at 537-38.
170. See id. at 540.
171. See, e.g., Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 396 F.3d 508, 511-12 (2d Cir.
2005).
172. Id. at 511.
173. Id. at511-12.
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lead to contrary and confusing results that do little to promote
consumer welfare.
Follow-on lawsuits have been filed against a number of
businesses, including the consumer credit industry, 74 computer
companies, 175 and pharmaceutical manufacturers.176 For example,
state attorneys general and plaintiffs' lawyers have filed suits against
pharmaceutical companies after the FDA issued a letter directing an
individual company to change its advertising to doctors or directly to
consumers. 177  Direct-to-consumer ("DTC") advertising can be a
174. For example, in 1999, the San Francisco district attorney's office and
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency charged Providian with
misleading, unfair, and deceptive practices. See In re Providian Credit Card
Cases, 2003 WL 23002628 (S.F. County, Cal. 2003). In June 2000, the OCC
ordered Providian to cease certain marketing activities and the company paid a
$300 million penalty in restitution to customers. See Suzanne Koudsi, Sleazy
Credit, FORTUNE, Mar. 4, 2002, at 143, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Fortun file. In settling a follow-on private class action lawsuit addressing the
same behavior in December 2000, Providian agreed to pay $105 million in
additional customer restitution and attorneys' fees. See Amy Merrick,
Providian to Pay $105 Million to Settle Lawsuits Over Some Marketing
Practices, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2000, at A13. One of the law firms
representing the plaintiffs noted on its web page describing the settlement:
"This [class action] supplements a settlement with government entities...."
Case Watch, COHEN MILSTEIN HAUSFELD & TOLL, P.L.L.C.,
http://www.cmht.com/casewatch/cases/cwprovidian2.htm (last visited Nov. 15,
2004).
175. See N.J. Users Join Wave of Private Lawsuits Against Microsoft,
Assoc. PRESS, Dec. 29, 1999, WL 12/29/99 APWIRES 16:45:00 (reporting
that after a federal court ruled against Microsoft in a government antitrust case,
approximately sixty "copycat" class action lawsuits in twenty-one states and
the District of Columbia were filed against Microsoft alleging consumers were
overcharged for its Windows program); A Victory for Trial Lawyers,
INVESTORS Bus. DAILY, Apr. 4, 2000, at A24 (as of April 2000, 115 private
lawsuits had been filed), available at LEXIS, News Library, Invdly file; see
also Editorial, Actions Without Class, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1999, at A38,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Wpost file.
176. See, e.g., New Jersey Citizen Action v. Schering-Plough Corp., 842
A.2d 174, 177 (N.J. App. 2003) (holding that regardless of the claims set forth
in the DTC advertising campaign, Schering's products still were subject to
"strict regulation" by the FDA and that under case law, a pharmaceutical
manufacturer's compliance with FDA regulations, including those relating to
DTC marketing campaigns, may shield the manufacturer in failure to warn
cases.)
177. Cases are typically brought under vague and broadly worded state
consumer protection laws, alleging that the companies have misrepresented
their products. See, e.g., id. (upholding dismissal of nationwide class action
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controversial practice. 178  Yet the FDA heavily regulates DTC
advertising by pharmaceutical product companies.'1 79 If the lawsuits
end in verdicts or settlement, such litigation would undermine the
FDA's ability to work with companies to make sure there are clear
standards for presenting risk information about pharmaceuticals. As
one commentator explained:
[I]t is federal law that governs what drug information gets
disclosed, to whom, and at what point in time. And for good
reason. This country decided long ago that it was better to
have a single agency distributing uniform drug info than to
have 50 state attorneys general (and their tort-law retinue)
with varied political agendas sending out conflicting safety
messages. 180
consumer fraud claims based on alleged deceptive DTC advertising of allergy
drug Claritin), cert. denied, 837 A.2d 1092 (N.J. 2003); In re Paxil Litig., 2002
WL 1940708 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (granting preliminary injunction requiring Paxil
manufacturer to withdraw television advertising that said product was "non-
habit forming" despite approval of the advertisements by the FDA), rev 'd 2002
WL 31375497 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (stating plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on
claim that advertising was misleading). See generally Linda A. Willett,
Litigation as an Alternative to Regulation: Problems Created by Follow-On
Lawsuits with Multiple Outcomes, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1477 (2005).
178. See, e.g., Comments of the Staff of the Bureau of Consumer Prot., The
Bureau of Econ. & The Off. of Pol'y Plan. of the FTC, In the Matter of
Request for Comments on Consumer-Directed Promotion, Docket No. 2003N-
0344, 3-4, 6 (Dec. 1, 2003) (analyzing the overall economic effects of direct-
to-consumer for the FDA); id. at 5-15 (discussing surveys on impact of DTC
advertising on consumers); Direct to Consumer Advertising: Hearing Before
the Senate Special Comm. on Aging (July 22, 2003) (statement of
Arnold S. Relman, M.D.), 2003 WL 21694495.
179. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), along with the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), is charged with the responsibility to
oversee direct-to-consumer ("DTC") advertising. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 202.1 et
seq; Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (prohibiting "unfair or
deceptive act[s] or practice[s] in or affecting commerce") & § 52 (prohibiting
dissemination of false advertisements regarding foods, drugs, devices, services
or cosmetics). Pharmaceutical companies must comply with a detailed set of
regulations governing DTC advertising and submit all such advertising for
FDA review. The FDA has a wide range of enforcement powers. Companies
typically respond to FDA concerns about DTC advertising by changing or
withdrawing the advertisement, or, in some cases, by issuing "corrective"
advertisements meant to clarify aspects of earlier advertisements. Companies
can take responsive action without admitting wrongdoing, or they can
challenge the FDA's concerns.
180. See Editorial, Paxil Man, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2004, at A 16.
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Injecting tort litigation into this formula would adversely affect
consumers, as risk information likely would be less coordinated and
less reliable. Most importantly, product risk information would no
longer be determined by experts from the FDA who can study and
review information through public hearings and in-depth analysis.
Instead, this process would be relegated to state attorneys general
and private plaintiffs' counsel, whose staff and hired experts cannot
approach the breadth and depth of the FDA's technical expertise. In
addition, conflicting legal requirements arising from various lawsuits
would interfere with the development of new or additional regulatory
schemes and increase uncertainty about the governing rules in those
jurisdictions. The cost for producing and marketing pharmaceutical
products to account for the peculiar requirement in each jurisdiction
would increase, which would raise the price of the drugs for
consumers or be subtracted from research and development budgets,
thereby slowing the development of beneficial pharmaceutical
products.
The fact of the matter is that "regulation through litigation" and
"follow-on" actions invade the federal government's legislative and
regulatory authority. While their ends may seem attractive to the
general public, and to Some judges, their means may actually
undermine the ultimate health and safety of consumers.
D. Trend 4: The Relaxation of Traditional Tort Requirements
As with regulation through litigation suits, the ability of the
judicial system to operate as a reliable transfer mechanism for tort
injuries is undermined when courts alter the traditional elements of
tort law, such as injury or causation. 18 1  These suits produce
unpredictable results, and it may take an exceedingly long time for
the parties to work through pre-trial issues when they are litigating in
uncharted waters. Such creative judicial lawmaking also creates
significant appellate issues, which may take years to bring to
181. For a more thorough discussion of this problem, see Victor E. Schwartz
& Rochelle M. Tedesco, The Law of Unintended Consequences in Asbestos
Litigation: How Efforts to Streamline The Litigation Have Fueled More
Claims, 71 MIss. L.J. 531 (2001), and Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, A
Letter to the Nation's Trial Judges: How the Focus on Efficiency Is Hurting
You and Innocent Victims in Asbestos Liability Cases, 24 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 247 (2000).
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conclusion.
1. Unimpaired Claimants in Asbestos Litigation
Recent estimates indicate that as many as 90% of new asbestos
claimants have little or no physical impairment. 8 2 As a basis for
filing a lawsuit, these claimants present the court with X-rays that
supposedly indicate a condition consistent with exposure to
asbestos.183 These claims should not be allowed, as "one of the
fundamental principles of tort law has been that a plaintiff cannot
recover without proof of a physical injury."'184  Lawsuits by
unimpaired claimants clog court dockets and delay the adjudication
of claims by persons who are actually injured, as the claims alleging
actual injury get "lost in the shuffle"' 8 5 or must wait their turn for
182. See AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, OVERVIEW OF ASBESTOS ISSUES AND
TRENDS 3 (Dec. 2001), http://www.actuary.org/mono.htm. (last visited Mar.
11, 2005); Roger Parloff, Welcome to the New Asbestos Scandal, FORTUNE,
Sept. 6, 2004, at 186 ("According to estimates accepted by the most
experienced federal judges in this area, two-thirds to 90% of the nonmalignants
are 'unimpaireds'-that is, they have slight or no physical symptoms. Indeed,
many nonmalignants actually have ailments that have nothing to do with
asbestos-or have nothing wrong with them at all."), available at LEXIS,
News Library, Fortun file.
183. See David W. Cugell & David W. Kamp, Asbestos and the Pleura,
CHEST, Mar. 1, 2004, at 1103 (scientifically concluding that asymptomatic
asbestos pleural effusions have no specific prognostic implications for future
injury); Victor E. Schwartz et al., Addressing the "Elephantine Mass" of
Asbestos Cases: Consolidation Versus Inactive Dockets (Pleural Registries)
and Case Management Plans that Defer Claims Filed by the Non-Sick, 31
PEPP. L. REV. 271, 277-79 (2004); In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI),
1996 WL 539589, *2 n.8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 1996) (Weiner, J.) ("Pleural
disease is most often an asymptomatic scarring of the pleura-a tissue thin
membrane surrounding the lung .... It can only be discovered through x-ray
and, in and of itself, does not pose a health risk or impairment."); In re Haw.
Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1567 (D. Haw. 1990) (recognizing
that unimpaired claimants "lead active, normal lives, with no pain or suffering,
no loss of the use of an organ or disfigurement due to scarring").
184. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring: Should Tort Law Say
Yes?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1057, 1059 (1999).
185. In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., (No. VI), No. Civ. A. MDL 875,
1996 WL 539589, *1 (Senior United States District Judge Charles Weiner,
who manages the federal asbestos docket, has explained that "[o]nly a very
small percentage of the cases filed have serious asbestos-related afflictions, but
they are prone to be lost in the shuffle with pleural and other non-malignancy
cases.").
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judicial attention.' 86 As companies increasingly file bankruptcy as a
result of asbestos or other mass tort litigation, the failure to
adjudicate a truly injured plaintiff's claim in a timely fashion
increases the risk that that the plaintiff will not receive timely or
adequate compensation.
187
Indeed, lawyers who represent cancer victims have expressed
strong concern that filings by the unimpaired are threatening
payments to their clients. 188  The case of the Johns-Manville
Company is particularly illustrative of this point. Johns-Manville
filed for bankruptcy in 1982.189 It took six years for the company's
186. See id.
187. See id. at *1; see also In re Collins, 233 F.3d 809, 812 (3d Cir. 2000)
(noting that scarce resources should go to "the sick and dying, their widows
and survivors"), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1066 (2001) (internal citation omitted);
Larson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399 N.W.2d 1, 23 (Mich. 1986) ("We
believe that discouraging suits for relatively minor consequences of asbestos
exposure will lead to a fairer allocation of resources to those victims who
develop cancers."); Steven Hantler, Judges Must Play Key Role in Stemming
Tide of Asbestos Litigation, 25:14 ANDREWs ASBESTOS LITIG. REP., 12 (May
22, 2003) ("The tragedy is that as plaintiffs' lawyers enroll the healthy into
their lawsuits in order to line their own pockets, less money is available for
those who are actually sick and dying."); Hon. Griffin Bell, Follow Bar
Association's Lead, Clean Up Asbestos Lawsuit Mess, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
Apr. 3, 2003 ("The relatively few sick plaintiffs, in desperate need but with
little time, have their payments delayed and reduced due to the volume of cases
and recoveries by the nonsick and their lawyers.").
188. For example, Steve Kazan of Oakland, California has testified that
recoveries by the unimpaired may result in his clients being left
uncompensated. See Asbestos Litigation: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 43 (Mar. 5, 2003) (statement of Steven Kazan,
partner, Kazan, McClain, Edises, Abrams, Fernandez, Lyons & Farrise).
Matthew Bergman of Seattle, Washington, has stated that "[v]ictims of
mesothelioma, the most deadly form of asbestos-related illness, suffer the most
from the current system. As a result of these bankruptcies, the genuinely sick
and dying are often deprived of adequate compensation as more and more
funds are diverted into settlements of the non-impaired claims." Matthew
Bergman & Jackson Schmidt, Editorial, Change Rules on Asbestos Lawsuits,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 30, 2002, at B7, available at LEXIS,
News Library, Seapin file. Victor Schwartz, co-author of the most widely used
torts casebook, PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ'S TORTS (10th ed. 2000), and
the former Chairman of the Federal Interagency Task Force on Products
Liability, has explained that "[f]looding the courts with asbestos cases filed by
people who are not sick against defendants who have not been shown to be at
fault is not sound public policy." Medical Monitoring, supra note 126
(quoting Mr. Schwartz).
189. See Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988)
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bankruptcy plan to be confirmed. 190 Payments to Manville Trust
claimants were halted in 1990,191 and did not resume until 1995.192
According to those running the trust, a "disproportionate amount of
Trust settlement dollars have gone to the least injured claimants-
many with no discernible asbestos-related physical impairment
whatsoever."' 193 As a result, the Trust is now paying out just five
cents on the dollar to asbestos claimants.'
94
It should not be surprising, then, that the widow of one
Washington State man who died from mesothelioma has been told
that she should expect to receive only 50% of the $1 million she
might have received if her husband had filed suit before the
companies he sued went bankrupt. 195  Similarly, the widow of a
mechanic in Ohio will recover at most $150,000 of the $4.4 million
dollar award that she received for her husband's death.' 96
2. Medical Monitoring Suits
A developing area of law that also threatens recoveries for sick
asbestos claimants and other plaintiffs with actual injuries is medical
monitoring litigation brought by individuals who have no actual,
present physical injuries. 19 7  In these suits, the plaintiffs allege
(discussing case history).
190. In re Johns-Manville, 68 B.R. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (approving con-
firmation of reorganization plan), order affd, Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988).
191. In re Joint E. & S. Asbestos Litig., Bankr. Nos. 82 B 11656 (BRL) to
82 B 11 676, (BRL), 1990 WL 115761 (E.D.N.Y. July 9, 1990) (ordering
temporary stay of payments to claimants). The order was modified in 1990 to
allow payment of only those claims by claimants meeting certain criteria for
severe health impairments or extreme financial hardship as a direct result of
exposure to asbestos. See id.
192. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 878 F. Supp. 473
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (approving settlement plan for pro rata distributiion of funds
to unpaid present and future claimants).
193. Quenna Sook Kim, Asbestos Trusts Says Assets Are Reduced as the
Medically Unimpaired File Claims, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2001, at B6.
194. See id.
195. See Albert B. Crenshaw, For Asbestos Victims, Compensation Remains
Elusive, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2002, at El, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Wpost file.
196. See Stephen Hudak & John F. Hagan, Asbestos Litigation Overwhelms
Courts, CLEVELAND (OHIO) PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 5, 2002, at Al, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Clevpd file.
197. As one federal court rejecting medical monitoring noted,
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exposure to a potentially hazardous substance. They do not allege
that they have been physically injured. Rather, they seek to recover
the future costs of periodic medical checkups, medical tests and other
procedures intended to diagnose the possible future onset of an
exposure-related disease.'
98
As indicated earlier, allowing individuals to "recover" in
personal injury litigation when they have no physical injury violates
traditional tort law. Courts, including the United States Supreme
Court, have recognized that requiring physical injury is the best filter
to prevent a flood of speculative claims, to ensure that defendants are
only held liable for genuine harm, and to allow the courts to focus on
"reliable and serious" claims. 199  In rejecting medical monitoring
claims under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"),20 0 the
United States Supreme Court in Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v.
Buckley said, "tens of millions of individuals may have suffered
There is little doubt that millions of people have suffered exposure to
hazardous substances. Obviously, allowing individuals who have not
suffered any demonstrable injury from such exposure to recover the
costs of future medical monitoring in a civil action could potentially
devastate the court system as well as defendants.... [T]here must be a
realization that such defendants' pockets or bank accounts do not
contain infinite resources. Allowing today's generation of exposed
but uninjured plaintiffs to recover may lead to tomorrow's generation
of exposed and injured plaintiff s [sic] being remediless.
Ball v. Joy Mfg. Co., 755 F. Supp. 1344, 1372 (S.D. W. Va. 1990) (applying
Virginia law), aff'd, 958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1033
(1992). Experience in Louisiana has shown this to be true since medical
monitoring was recognized as a cause of action in Bourgeois v. A.P. Green
Industries, Inc., 716 So. 2d 355 (La. 1998). See, e.g., Dragon v. Cooper/T.
Smith Stevedoring Co., 726 So. 2d 1006 (La. App. 1999) (permitting a class
action under Louisiana law for medical monitoring for seamen exposed to
asbestos); Scott v. Am. Tobacco Co., 725 So. 2d 10, 18-19 (La. App. 1998)
(certifying as a medical monitoring class all Louisiana residents who were
cigarette smokers on or before May 24, 1996 provided that each claimant
started smoking on or before Sept 1, 1988), writ denied, 731 So. 2d 189 (La.
1999).
198. See Arvin Maskin et al., Medical Monitoring: A Viable Remedy for
Deserving Plaintiffs or Tort Law's Most Expensive Consolation Prize?, 27
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 521, 522 (2000).
199. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424,444 (1997).
200. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60. FELA is a federal statute that defines rights
and duties in personal injury cases brought by railroad workers against their
employer railroads. FELA is the tort equivalent of workers' compensation in
the railroad field.
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exposure to substances that might justify some form of substance-
exposure related monitoring. ' 2° Nevertheless, the Court drew a line
and only allowed recovery for medical monitoring costs for those
with present physical impairment.
20 2
West Virginia Justice Elliott "Spike" Maynard echoed this
sentiment in his dissenting opinion in his state's seminal medical
monitoring case: "[T]he practical effect of this decision is to make
almost every West Virginian a potential plaintiff in a medical
monitoring cause of action." 20 3 In states like West Virginia, which
allow cash recovery for medical monitoring claims even if such
checkups would provide no medical benefit to the plaintiff,20 4
plaintiffs' attorneys do not have to wait for injury to file suit. The
familiar advertisement, "Have you been injured?" is becoming,
"Don't wait until you're hurt, call now!
'" 20 5
In recent years, a number of states have rejected requests to
make medical monitoring claims available in their states absent
physical injury.206 First, they did not want to crowd the dockets and
delay access to justice for those with present, serious, physical
207injuries. Second, they have expressed concern about the efficacy
of medical monitoring awards. 20 8 For example, would monitoring
lead to earlier detection than traditional symptoms? 20 9 Would early
detection of the disease allow for beneficial and effective
201. Buckley, 521 U.S. at 442.
202. See id. at 436 (denying foundation for recovery at common law for
emotional distress unaccompanied by symptoms of physical injury).
203. Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 435 (W. Va.
1999) (Maynard, J., dissenting).
204. See id. at 431.
205. See Victor Schwartz, Some Lawyers Ask, Why Wait for Injury? Sue
Now!, USA TODAY, July 15, 1999, at A17.
206. See, e.g., Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849 (Ky. 2002);
Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 440 (Nev. 2001); Hinton v.
Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827 (Ala. 2001).
207. See Hinton, 813 So. 2d at 831 (quoting Buckley, 521 U.S. at 441-43.
208. See, e.g., Wood, 82 S.W.3d at 857.
209. See W.K.C. Morgan, Medical Monitoring with Particular Attention to
Screening for Lung Cancer, in OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASE 158 (J. Bernard
L. Gee et al. eds., 1984) (citing the criteria formulated by the World Health
Organization ("WHO"), including "[t]here should be a recognizable latent or
early symptomatic stage" and "[t]here should be a suitable screening test or
examination for detecting the disease at the latent or early symptomatic stage,
and this test should be acceptable to the population").
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treatment? 210  How can a court assure that medical monitoring
awards will be spent on medical monitoring?211 As one commentator
observed, "[t]he incentive for healthy plaintiffs to carefully hoard
their award, and faithfully spend it on periodic medical examinations
to detect an illness they will in all likelihood never contract, seems
negligible.
'" 212
E. Trend 5: Depriving Juries of Reliable, Relevant Information
In the U.S. civil justice system, juries decide most cases that go
to court.213 More than two-thirds of the public consider juries to be
the most important part of the justice system, and more than three-
quarters of the public believes that the jury system is the best way to
determine guilt or innocence. 2 14 But juries cannot do their jobs when
courts ask them to make decisions on insufficient or inaccurate
210. See id. at 157-58 (citing WHO criteria including "[t]here should be an
acceptable form of treatment for patients with recognizable disease" and
"[t]reatment at the presymptomatic, borderline stage of disease should
favorably influence its course and prognosis"; and noting these criteria are "as
apropos now as when they were first published").
211. Victor E. Schwartz, Leah Lorber & Emily J. Laird, Medical
Monitoring: The Right Way and The Wrong Way, 65 Mo. L. REV. (forthcoming
2005) (manuscript on file with authors); approximately 80% of all standard
medical testing is paid for by third party insurance. See AM. LAW INST., 2
ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY-REPORTERS' STUDY
379 (1991).
212. Maskin, supra note 198, at 540-41; see also George W.C. McCarter,
Medical Sue-Veillance: A History and Critique of the Medical Monitoring
Remedy In Toxic Tort Litigation, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 227, 283 (1993) ("[T]he
potential for abuse is apparent."); Lilley v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State
Univ., 735 So. 2d 696 (La. App.), writ denied, 744 So. 2d 629 (La. 1999). One
year after the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized medical monitoring as a
cause of action, the trial court awarded $12,000 per plaintiff for medical
monitoring despite the fact the Bourgeois court expressly declined to extend its
holding to claims for lump sum damages. Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus.,
Inc., 716 So. 2d 355, 357 n.3 (La. 1998). The award was overturned on appeal.
Lilley, 735 So. 2d at 705-06.
213. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Federal Tort Trials and Verdicts, 1996-97
in BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN 4, (NCJ 172855, Feb. 1999)
(citing federal court statistics), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
fttv97.pdf.
214. See AM. BAR ASS'N, A.B.A. PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE
SYSTEM 6-7 (1998), http://www.abanet.org/media/perception/perceptions.pdf
(last visited June 10, 2005).
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information.
215
1. Juries That Are Not Fully Informed Cannot Reach a Fair Verdict
As a matter of course, jurors are not given information involving
certain facts, circumstances, or legal rules that could have a bearing
on their decision making. For example, in a type of litigation that the
authors have significant experience observing, thirty-two states do
not allow jurors to consider a plaintiff's seatbelt use in assessing
damages in an automotive product liability case. 216 Some juries may
215. For an extensive discussion of this problem, see Steven B. Hantler,
Victor E. Schwartz, Cary Silverman & Emily J. Laird, Moving Toward the
Fully Informed Civil Jury, 3 GEO. J. L. &.PUB. POL. 21 (2005).
216. See Christopher Hall, Nonuse of Seatbelt as Reducing Amount of
Damages Recoverable, 62 A.L.R.5th 537 § 3 (1998). These jurisdictions
include: Alabama (Britton v. Doehring, 242 So. 2d 666, 674 (Ala. 1970));
Arkansas (ARK. CODE. ANN. § 27-37-703 (Michie 1991)); Connecticut (CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-100a(c)(4) (West 1999)); Delaware (Lipscomb v.
Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914, 918 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967); but see Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Wolhar, 686 A.2d 170, 176-77 (Del. 1996) (allowing in evidence of
non-seatbelt usage as supervening cause when motorist alleges injuries from
being thrown around the vehicle as a result of negligent design)); District of
Columbia (McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720, 722 (D.C. 1976)); Georgia (GA.
CODE ANN. § 40-8-76.1(d) (1993)); Idaho (Quick v. Crane, 727 P.2d 1187,
1208 (Idaho 1986)); Illinois (Clarkson v. Wright, 483 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ill.
1985)); Indiana (State v. Ingram, 427 N.E.2d 444, 448 (Ind. 1981)); Kansas
(Gardner v. Chrysler Corp., 89 F.3d 729, 733-34 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying
Kansas law)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:295.1(E)); Minnesota
(MINN. STAT. § 139.685, subd. 4)); Mississippi (D.W. Boutwell Butane Co. v.
Smith, 244 So. 2d 11, 12 (Miss. 1971)); Montana (Livingston v. Isuzu Motors,
Ltd., 910 F. Supp. 1473, 1482 (D. Mont. 1995) (citing MONT. CODE ANN. §
61-13-106)); Nevada (Jeep Corp. v. Murray, 708 P.2d 297, 301 (Nev. 1985));
New Hampshire (Thibeault v. Campbell, 622 A.2d 212, 214 (N.H. 1993)
(citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 265:107-a (Supp. 1992))); New Mexico (Mott
v. Sun Country Garden Prods., Inc., 901 P.2d 192, 198 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995)
(citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-7-373 (Michie 1978)); North Carolina (Barron v.
Ford Motor Co. of Canada Ltd., 965 F.2d 195, 198 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying
North Carolina law)); Ohio (Vogel v. Wells, 566 N.E.2d 154, 158 (Ohio
1991)); Oklahoma (Fields v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 62 (Okla.
1976)); Pennsylvania (Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 569 F.2d 754, 767 (3d Cir.
1977) (applying Pennsylvania law)); Rhode Island (Swajian v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 559 A.2d 1041, 1046 (R.I. 1989)); South Carolina (Jones v. Dague, 166
S.E.2d 99, 103 (S.C. 1969)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-38-4));
Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-9-604)); Texas (Carnation Co. v. Wong,
516 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Tex. 1974)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-186
(1953)); Virginia (Freeman v. Case Corp., 924 F. Supp. 1456, 1469 (W.D. Va.
1996), rev'd on other grounds, 118 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
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find this information particularly relevant, as the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") has found that safety belts
reduce death and serious injury of front seat occupants by 50%,217
saved an estimated 14,000 motorists in 2002, and avoided "billions
of dollars in costs to society annually" by "saving lives and
preventing injuries." 218  In fact, only nine states allow jurors to
consider seatbelt use as evidence of contributory negligence,
2 19
sometimes referred to as the "seatbelt defense."
220
At the time many of these rules were made, there was some
question about the efficacy of seatbelts, which has since been
resolved.22' Courts also were hesitant to allow a jury to deprive a
plaintiff who was not wearing a seatbelt of all recovery if the
plaintiff was not at fault for the accident.222 In modem litigation,
comparative fault rules in the majority of jurisdictions allow
plaintiffs whose fault contributed to the accident to recover a
522 U.S. 1069 (1998) (recognizing rule)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE §
46.61.688(6)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 17C-15-49(d) (1993));
Wyoming (Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153, 1162 (Wyo. 1992)).
217. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
MAY 2003 CLICK IT OR TICKET SAFETY BELT MOBILIZATION EVALUATION
FINAL REPORT (Nov. 2003), at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/
airbags/clickitticke03/ciot-report4/CIOT%2May/o202003/pages/Intro.htm
(last visited June 17, 2005).
218. Id. at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/airbags/clickitticke03/
ciot-report04/CIOT%2OMay%202003/pages/VDiscussion.htm (last visited
June 17, 2005).
219. See Thomas R. Trenkner, Automobile Occupant's Failure to Use Seat
Belt as Contributory Negligence, 92 A.L.R.3d 9 § 5 (2004). These states
include California (Truman v. Vargas, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373, 377 (Cal. Ct. App.
1969)); Connecticut (Tempe v. Giacco, 442 A.2d 947 (Conn. Super. 1981));
Florida (Ridley v. Safety Kleen Corp., 693 So. 2d 934, 943 (Fla. 1997));
Indiana (Mays v. Dealers Transit, Inc., 441 F.2d 1344, 1355 (7th Cir. 1971)
(applying Indiana law)); but see Gibson v. Henninger, 350 N.E.2d 631, 632
(Ind. Ct. App. 1976)); Kentucky (Geyer v. Mankin, 984 S.W.2d 104 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1998)); Maryland (Cierpisz v. Singleton, 230 A.2d 629, 635 (Md. 1967));
New Jersey (Nunez v. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, 217 F. Supp. 2d 562, 567
(D.N.J. 2002)); South Carolina (Sams v. Sams, 148 S.E.2d 154, 155 (S.C.
1966)); and Virginia (Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 581, 584-87
(E.D. Va. 1999)).
220. See Michelle R. Mangrum, The Seat Belt Defense: Must the Reasonable
Man Wear a Seat Belt?, 50 MO. L. REV. 968, 968 (1985).
221. See id. at 969 n.8.
222. See, e.g., Fischer v. Moore, 517 P.2d 458, 459-60 (Colo. 1973) (en
banc).
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damages award that is adjusted for their own fault. Thus, there is no
reason to keep such evidence from a jury.
223
In addition to factual evidence being withheld, juries may not
know that a defendant they find slightly responsible for an injury
may have to pay the entire award because of joint and several
liability. Juries also are generally not told that a plaintiff may have
received a significant amount of compensation from an insurance
policy or from defendants who settled before trial.224 The underlying
rationale for not sharing this information with the jury, generally
speaking, is concern that juries cannot properly evaluate the evidence
and will make decisions based on bias and prejudice. This thinking
is wrong.
2. Junk Science
Weakened causation requirements through the admission of
"junk science" led to a flood of products litigation in the 1980s and
early 1990s. 22 In 1993, the United States Supreme Court in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. reaffirmed the duty of federal
judges to act as "gatekeepers" of scientific evidence presented in
226their courts. In 1999, the Court in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v.
Carmichae2 27 extended this "gatekeeping" obligation to all expert
223. See generally VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (4th
ed., 2002).
224. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A (1979) (stating that the
collateral source rule provides that in computing damages, a jury is not
permitted to consider compensation the plaintiff received for the injury from
sources other than the defendant, even if the payments partially or completely
mitigated the plaintiff's actual monetary loss).
225. See, e.g., KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE:
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 257-59 (1997) (noting
flood of Bendectin and breast implant lawsuits based on "specious scientific
evidence"); Richard Hazelton, Rule of Law: The Tort Monster That Ate Dow
Corning, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1995, at A21 (noting that Dow Coming, the
leading breast implant manufacturer, filed for Chapter 11 protection in 1995 as
a result of lawsuits spurred by faulty expert studies).
226. 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
227. 526 U.S. 137, 148-49 (1999) ("Experts of all kinds tie observations to
conclusions through the use of what Judge Learned Hand called 'general truths
derived from.., specialized experience....' The trial judge's effort to assure
that the specialized testimony is reliable and relevant can help the jury evaluate
that foreign experience, whether the testimony reflects scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge.") (citation omitted).
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testimony in federal court. As the Daubert Court explained, because
expert testimony can sway a case (particularly in mass tort litigation
involving complex medical science), it is the obligation of the judge
to ensure that scientific expert testimony is reliable and truly helpful
to the jury or other trier of fact in assessing the facts.
228
Subsequently, the Court in General Electric Co. v. Joiner concluded
that district courts should scrutinize the reliability of experts'
reasoning processes as well as their general methodology.
229
This was a distinct departure from the "general acceptance test"
that courts had followed since the 1923 decision by the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Frye
v. United States.230 Under Frye, courts generally examined "only the
general acceptance of an expert's overarching methodology and not
also whether that methodology was used in a particular case in a
generally accepted way." 23 Therefore, in states where Frye is still in
effect, scientific testimony may be scientifically unreliable and
represent no more than the personal opinion of a paid expert witness.
A number of states have adopted Daubert, but a significant
number have not. In a recent survey of state evidence law, it was
found that only ten states have adopted all three holdings in the
Daubert trilogy.232  Six states have adopted Daubert and Kumho
Tire, but not Joiner.233 Eight states have adopted Daubert, but not
Kumho Tire or Joiner.234  Five states, while not fully adopting
Daubert, use the Daubert principles in their own tests. 235 Eight
228. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-92.
229. 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) ("[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal
Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may
conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and
the opinion proffered.").
230. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
231. David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the
States, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 351, 353 (2004).
232. See id. at 357 (naming Arkansas, Delaware, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Texas and Wyoming); see also GA. CODE
ANN. § 24-9-67.1 (effective 2005).
233. See Bernstein & Jackson, supra note 231, at 357-58 (naming Kentucky,
Ohio, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and South Dakota).
234. See id. at 358-61 (naming Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Montana,
New Mexico, Oregon, Vermont, and West Virginia).
235. See id. at 361-63 (naming Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, and
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states follow neither Daubert nor Frye.236 The remaining states still
apply Frye.
F. Trend 6: Creation of "Judicial Hellholes"
Courts that take many of the aforementioned short cuts or relax
traditional tort law requirements in ways discussed above tend to
become what the American Tort Reform Association ("ATRA") calls
"judicial hellholes" 237 and what Mississippi plaintiffs' lawyer
Richard Scruggs calls "magic jurisdictions. According to Mr.
Scruggs, these are venues "where the judiciary is elected with verdict
money" and "[t]he trial lawyers have established relationships with
the judges." 239 In these courts, he has said, "it's almost impossible to
get a fair trial if you're a defendant" 240 and a "lawyer fresh out of law
school can walk in there and win the case, so it doesn't matter what
the evidence or the law is."241 Rather than file cases where there
might be a logical connection to the injury, the plaintiffs or the
defendants, plaintiffs' lawyers seek to file their cases in the these
"magic jurisdictions" because of their reputation for expedient or
large settlements or verdicts.
Consider, for example, an Indiana plaintiff who had worked for
decades at a U.S. Steel facility in Indiana and had no significant
connection to Illinois. He filed his asbestos-related suit in Madison
County, Illinois, a well-known magic jurisdiction, and obtained a
$250 million verdict in 2003.242 The case later settled for an amount
Maine).
236. See id. at 363-66 (naming Idaho, New Jersey, Nevada, North Dakota,
South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin).
237. AM. TORT REFORM Ass'N, BRINGING JUSTICE TO JUDICIAL HELLHOLES
(2004).
238. See Richard Scruggs, Panel Discussion at the Prudential Securities
Financial Research and Regulatory Conference (May 9, 2002), Asbestos for
Lunch, in INDUS. COMM. (Prudential Securities, Inc., N.Y., New York), June
11, 2002, at 5. Mr. Scruggs also has described these jurisdictions as "areas
where what happens in court is irrelevant because the jury will return a verdict
in the favor of the plaintiff." Medical Monitoring, supra note 126, at 1, 6.
239. Scruggs, supra note 238, at 5.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See Brian Brueggemann, Man Awarded $250 Million in Cancer Case,
BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT, Mar. 29, 2003, at 40; Victor E. Schwartz,
Mark A. Behrens & Kimberly D. Sandner, Asbestos Litigation in Madison
County, Illinois: The Challenge Ahead, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 235, 245
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believed to be in the millions of dollars. Former U.S. Attorney
General Griffin Bell has explained that plaintiffs file claims in these
areas because the "lack of due process will make it virtually
impossible for defendants to prepare for trial and will force
settlements far higher than a plaintiff could recover at home."
244
Further, many claims filed in these jurisdictions have little or no
merit, but are filed in the hopes of reaching settlement. 24 5  in
Mississippi, which had been rated as having the worst legal system in
the country,246 the state supreme court characterized this trend as a
"perversion of the judicial system." 247 The case that sparked the
Mississippi court's comment was a consolidated asbestos-related
action with 264 individual plaintiffs' claims against 137
manufacturers for asbestos exposure allegedly occurring in
approximately 600 workplaces over seventy-five years. 4 8 As the
court observed, the complaint provided "virtually no helpful
information" for the defendants to respond to the charges.249 Rather,
it appeared that the "plaintiffs intend[ed] to find out in discovery
whether or not, and against whom, they [had] a cause of action"2
50
and both sides allowed the case to languish on the court's docket for
(2004).
243. See Schwartz et al., note 242, at 245 n.64 and accompanying text.
244. Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Asbestos & the Sleeping Constitution, 31 PEPP. L.
REv. 1, 8 (2003).
245. See id. at 1, 7-9; Robert T. Horst et al., The Class Action Fairness Act
and the Revisions to Rule 23: Fixing a Broken System- Part I, 11 METRO.
CORP. CoUNs., No. 11, Nov. 2003, at 45.
246. See Tom Ramstack, Mississippi Ranked 'Worst Legal 'Climate', THE
WASHINGTON TIMES, March 10, 2004 http://www.washingtontimes.com/
functions/print.php?StorylD=20040309-091531-4584r.
247. Harold's Auto Parts, Inc. v. Mangialardi, 889 So. 2d 493, 495 (Miss.
2004). The court severed the claims and referred the individual claims to the
appropriate trial court, ordering the trial court to dismiss the claims without
prejudice unless the claimant provides sufficient information for the case to
proceed.
248. See id. at 494.
249. Id.
250. Id. (holding that absent exigent circumstances, "plaintiffs' counsel
should not file a complaint until sufficient information is obtained, and
plaintiffs' counsel believes in good faith that each plaintiff has an appropriate
cause of action to assert against a defendant in the jurisdiction where the
complaint is to be filed. To do otherwise is an abuse of the system, and is
sanctionable.").
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several years.
251
In St. Clair County, Illinois, 85% of medical malpractice claims
resolved from 1999 to 2003 resulted in no payment to the plaintiff-
an indication that many of the claims had no merit.25 2 Yet, St. Clair
County does not follow the intent of the Illinois law to safeguard
against frivolous suits by requiring the complaint to be accompanied
by an independent medical professional's certification that the claim
is potentially valid. Rather than allow the certification to serve as a
true gatekeeper, judges in St. Clair County allow the certifying
doctors to remain anonymous. 253  This practice prevents defense
lawyers from challenging the credentials of the doctors, thus
preventing defense lawyers from ensuring that the doctor has the
expertise in the procedure at issue and determining whether a
substantial fee was paid to the doctor for certifying the lawsuit.
254
These are among the jurisdictions termed "judicial hellholes" by
the ATRA in 2004.255 The filing of cases in jurisdictions that have
no meaningful connection to the claim or the claimant creates
judicial inefficiencies, clogs the courts for local people trying to
resolve local issues, and often results in unfair procedures that raise
serious due process concerns. 256 In addition, burdens placed on these
courts are unfair to the residents of those counties; local residents
may be forced to wait to have their cases heard.257
251. See id. at 495 (noting that "[tihis complaint comes to us from plaintiffs
who, more than three years ago, filed suit against 137 defendants; [the
plaintiffs] have amended their complaint six times .... ).
252. See ILLINOIS CIVIL JUSTICE LEAGUE, THE DIRTY LITTLE SECRET:
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAwSUITs AGAINST METRO-EAST DOCTORS 6 (2004)
(citing ISMIE Mutual Insurance Company legal outcomes data),
http://www.icjl.org/images/contentpdfs/040628_TheMedMalStudy.pdf (last
visited June 17, 2005) [hereinafter BRINGING JUSTICE TO JUDICIAL
HELLHOLES].
253. See Mike Fitzgerald & Patrick J. Powers, Secrecy Adds to Malpractice
Puzzle, BELLEVILLE (ILL.) NEWS-DEMOCRAT, June 13, 2004, at Al,
http://www.Belleville.com/mld/Belleville/news/8910959/htm (last visited Nov.
17, 2005).
254. See AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, BRINGING JUSTICE TO JUDICIAL
HELLHOLES 20 (2004).
255. See id.; AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, BRINGING JUSTICE TO JUDICIAL
HELLHOLES (2003); AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, BRINGING JUSTICE TO
JUDICIAL HELLHOLES (2002).
256. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
257. Venue rules exist to ensure that claims are brought in the proper county
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ATRA has found that when courts are overloaded, the system
breaks down. Cases drag out too long, or the pre-trial process is
short circuited, such that the case resolution is driven by time factors,
not the facts and the law. 258 With any transfer mechanism, there is
an optimal amount of time that it should take to work through the
issues and reach a resolution. Depending on the complexity of a
particular case, litigation can involve extensive discovery and
motions to develop the facts and narrow the legal issues. It is the
responsibility of the trial judge or court-appointed magistrate to
protect the integrity of this process by balancing the need for
thoroughness and the timely resolution of a case to ensure that this
process concludes in an appropriate amount of time. Generally, once
the pre-trial issues are settled and a trial date is set, attorneys can size
up their chances of success and reach settlement. In fact, on average,
more than 95% of civil cases settle.
259
III. SOLUTIONS
Mending America's civil justice system so that it can once again
administer justice effectively and efficiently will take a concerted
effort in legislatures and courts at both the federal and state levels.
within a state. These rules are set by statute and vary depending on the type of
claim and the type of defendant. Forum non conveniens is a common law
doctrine that enables a court to decline jurisdiction over a case where another
court provides a more convenient and acceptable forum in which to decide a
dispute between the parties. Dismissal of a case on forum non conveniens
grounds rests primarily on a determination that, all things considered, the other
forum has a greater connection to the controversy and in the interests of justice
would be the proper venue for the parties to air their grievances. Most, but not
all, state courts recognize this doctrine. In recent years, state legislatures have
begun taking their courts back from out-of-state forum shoppers by passing
stronger venue laws. West Virginia, Texas and Mississippi were all considered
magnet jurisdictions, and in the last few years, each has enacted meaningful
venue reform. See, e.g., BRINGING JUSTICE TO JUDICIAL HELLHOLES, supra
note 254, at 21 (2003);
258. See, e.g., BRINGING JUSTICE TO JUDICIAL HELLHOLES, supra note 254,
at 16 ("Over the last five to ten years, Judge Byron's 'rocket-docket,' where
'questions of venue, jurisdiction and liability fly out the window as trial dates
are quickly set,' has become a national haven for asbestos claims."); id. at 28-
29 (noting that national asbestos claims have clogged South Florida's
courtrooms, making it nearly impossible for local claims to be heard in a
timely fashion).
259. See, e.g., Robert B. McKay, Rule 16 and Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 818, 820 (1988).
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By its very nature, the judicial system is decentralized. The federal
and state governments each have their own court systems. Authority
to change substantive and procedural rules can come from both the
legislature and the courts. Sources of liability can be grounded in
common law as well as statutory law. The fixes that tend to be
successful restore fairness and predictability to the legal system
without restricting access to courts and legal claims.
A. Federal Solutions
Certain industries are national in nature and require federal
reforms in order to achieve effective solutions to litigation issues.
Congress has enacted a number of civil justice reforms during the
past ten years when the need has been defined and the solution
targeted. Relief has been provided in a number of areas. Some of
the most instructive laws include:
" The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.260
The Act allows defendants to remove what were formerly
nondiverse state law class actions if minimal diversity exists
and the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.
This effectively will foreclose the joinder of local defendants to
defeat complete diversity and prevent removal. The bill also
will foreclose the tactic of pleading damages of less than
$75,000 per class member to block removal. The Act also
governs certain "mass actions"-i.e., 100 or more claimants
seeking monetary relief that are proposed to be tried jointly,
and the claims comply with the existing federal jurisdictional
requirements.
" The Paul D. Coverdell Teacher Protection Act of 2001.261
This Act establishes liability protections for teachers,
principals, school board members, and other school
professionals for most acts committed in compliance with
the law or school rules, such as enforcing discipline,
grading students, or promoting safety. The Act does not
provide protection against civil rights violations, state and
federal sexual offenses, or intentional acts such as willful
260. Pub. L. 109-2, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005). See supra note 78 and
accompanying text.
261. Pub. L. No. 107-10, 115 Stat. 1667 (2002) (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. § 6731 (2002)).
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or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, or reckless
misconduct.
" The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act
262of 2001. This Act established an administrative fund to
provide a quick, no-fault recovery to persons injured or
killed in the September 11 attacks. 263  The Act also
provided airline carriers whose planes were involved in the
attacks with civil liability protections from September 11 th
terrorism-related lawsuits, including limits on liability and
exclusive federal jurisdiction over such claims.
264
* The Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998.265 This
Act limits suppliers of raw materials and component parts
used in medical devices from being included in product
266liability lawsuits. It helped avoid a serious public health
crisis by ensuring the availability of lifesaving and life-
enhancing implantable medical devices, such as
pacemakers, heart valves, and hip and knee joints.
267
Suppliers of those devices made a business judgment to
exit the market in order to avoid the legal costs which
accompanied their successful defense of meritless product
liability claims. 268 The Act encourages those suppliers to
reenter the market by allowing them to obtain early
dismissal, without extensive discovery or other legal costs,
in certain tort suits involving finished medical implants.2
69
" The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994.270 This
Act helped revive the ailing single-engine aircraft industry
by providing an eighteen-year statute of repose for
products liability lawsuits involving certain types of
262. Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101 (2000)).
263. §§ 403-406, 115 Stat. at 237-41.
264. § 408, 115 Stat. at 240.
265. Pub. L. No. 105-230, 112 Stat. 1519 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1606 (1998)).
266. § 5, 112 Stat. at 1524-26.
267. See § 2, 112 Stat. at 1519-20.
268. Id. at 1520.
269. § 6, 112 Stat. at 1526.
270. Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101 (2000)).
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aircraft. 27' Thousands of new jobs were created in the
industry.
272
Other federal liability laws passed in the last decade include the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002;273 the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act of 2001;274 the Amtrak Reform and
Accountability Act of 1997;275 the Volunteer Protection Act of
1997; 276 the Bill Emerson Good Samaritan Food Donation Act; 277 the
271. §§ 2-3, 108 Stat. at 1552-53.
272. See Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, The General Aviation
Revitalization Act: How Rational Civil Justice Reform Revitalized an Industry,
67 J. AIR L. & COM. 1269, 1282 (2002).
273. Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 6701 (1999)). This law was enacted to stabilize insurance markets after the
September 1 1th events. Id. at 2323. Among other things, the law requires
insurance companies to provide coverage for insured losses in all property and
casualty programs, despite any pre-existing exclusion for claims arising out of
an act of terrorism. Id. at 2327-28. In turn, the federal government is to
reimburse insurance companies up to 90% of their losses above insurer
deductibles. Id. at 2328. Congress also capped at $100 billion the annual
aggregate insured losses for which the federal government or an insurer which
had met its limits would be liable and provided exclusive federal jurisdiction
for claims for personal injury, property damage or death arising out of an act of
terrorism. Id. at 2328-29.
274. Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001) (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. § 40101 (2000). This Act provides civil liability limitations to other
potential parties to September 1 1th-related lawsuits, including aircraft
manufacturers, airport sponsors, persons with a property interest in the World
Trade Center, and the City of New York. Id. at 646. These liability
protections are not available to any person who was a knowing participant in
any conspiracy to hijack an aircraft or commit a terrorist act. Id.
275. Pub. L. No. 105-134, 111 Stat. 2570 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 20101 (1997)). This Act creates a federal standard for punitive damage
awards in tort cases brought against Amtrak by its passengers. Id. at 2577.
This law limits Amtrak's tort liability to $200 million for each rail accident.
Id. The legislation provides that punitive damages may be awarded "only if
the plaintiff establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the harm that is
the subject of the action was the result of conduct carried out by the defendant
with a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of others." Id.
276. Pub. L. No. 105-19, 111 Stat. 218 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 14501 (1997)). The Act provides civil liability protections to uncompensated
volunteers in various nonprofit organizations from liability arising from simple
negligence, assuming that they were acting within the scope of their
responsibilities to the organization. Id. at 219-20. The legislation does not
protect against liability for intentional acts such as willful misconduct, gross
negligence, or reckless misconduct. Id. at 220. Furthermore, the Act provides
no protection against state and federal sexual offenses or civil rights violations.
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Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996;278 The Homeland
Security Act of 2002;279 the Year 2000 Information and Readiness
Disclosure (Y2K) Act;280 the Aviation Medical Assistance Act of
1998;281 the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998;282
and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.283
Id. at 221.
277. Pub. L. No. 101-610, 104 Stat. 3183 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1791 (2005)). This legislation encourages retailers, farmers, restaurants, and
nonprofit feeding programs to donate safe food and grocery products to food
banks or soup kitchens. Other than harm arising from gross negligence or
intentional misconduct, the law states that donating groups will not be subject
to civil or criminal liability arising from the "nature, age, packaging, or
condition of apparently wholesome food or an apparently fit grocery
product.... ." Id. at 3184.
278. Pub. L. No. 104-264, 110 Stat. 3213, 3264 (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. § 40101 (2000)). This law limits unsolicited contacts by lawyers and
insurance company representatives with airline crash victims and their families
within 30 days following the incident, so that the families can act when they
are no longer under extreme duress and, therefore, are more capable of making
fully informed decisions. See id. at 3266.
279. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 101
(2003)). This law affords air security companies the same civil liability
protections from terrorism-related lawsuits that were extended to the airline
industry and others immediately after the September 11, 2001 terrorist activity
against the United States. Id. at 2312-13. The Support Anti-terrorism by
Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002 also provides civil liability
protections for manufacturers and suppliers of certain anti-terrorism products.
Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2238, 2240-41 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 441
(2003)).
280. Pub. L. No. 105-271, 112 Stat. 2386 (1998) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1 (2004)). This Act limits the liability of companies that failed to fix
their problems relating potential breakdowns of computers upon the arrival of
the Year 2000 and deters unwarranted Y2K lawsuits. See id.
281. Pub. L. No. 105-170, 112 Stat. 47 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 44701 (2000)). This law provides that an individual will not be liable for
damages when providing or attempting to provide assistance during an in-
flight medical emergency, except in cases of gross negligence or willful
misconduct. Id. at 49. The law also protects air carriers from liability in such
cases. Id. at 48-49.
282. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78a (1998)). This Act requires securities class actions involving nationally
traded securities based on false or misleading statements to be brought
exclusively in federal court under federal law. Id. at 3228. The passage of this
legislation negated efforts by plaintiffs' attorneys who attempted to end-run
provisions under the 1995 "Private Securities Litigation Reform Act" by filing
securities class actions in state courts. See id. at 3227.
283. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C.
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Congress is currently considering legislation that would serve
equally valid goals. The legislation includes bills proposing
solutions to the frivolous lawsuit problem, asbestos litigation, forum
shopping, medical liability, and obesity-related lawsuits. As
discussed earlier in this article, these issues are among those at the
heart of the excessive litigation problem in the United States.
1. Asbestos Litigation
Congress has considered two different. approaches to addressing
what the United States Supreme Court has called an "asbestos-
litigation crisis."284  One approach is to preempt tort law claims
related to the health effects of exposure to asbestos, instead making
compensation available through an administrative program run by
the federal government. 285 This approach calls for a multi-billion
dollar "trust fund", which defendant companies, insurance
companies, and the existing private trust funds of already-bankrupt
businesses would fund.286
The benefits of this approach would include potential
savings of litigation costs on issues relating to product
identification and proving "fault," and the hope for finality
in asbestos litigation. If a trust fund approach fulfilled all of
its goals, then members who contributed to the fund could
§ 78a and scattered sections). This law provides civil justice reform measures
for public companies and accounting firms.
284. Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997); see also Jan
Amundson, How A Congressional Answer to Asbestos Litigation Would Help
Litigants, Courts, and the American Economy, 44 S. TEx. L. REv. 925, 925-28
(2003).
285. See, e.g., The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2003, S.
1125, 108th Cong. (2003), and The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act
of 2004, S. 2290, 108th Cong. (2004), developed by former Senate Judiciary
Committee Chairman Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT) and Senate Majority Leader Bill
Frist (R-TN), respectively.
286. The FAIR Act of 2005 would establish a trust fund of a minimum of $3
billion a year, financed by defendant companies based on their historic
asbestos-related liability, insurance companies at amounts allocated by an
insurers commission, and the existing private trust funds of businesses that
have filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. See Fairness in Asbestos
Injury Resolution Act of 2005, S. 852, tit. II, subtit. A. The Act provides
medical criteria establishing ten levels of injury for which claimants are
eligible for compensation. See id., tit. III, subtit. B. A schedule included in the
bill sets award amounts for each level. See id., tit. III, subtit. B.
1181
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:1121
advise Wall Street analysts that they have complete closure
on their asbestos liability exposure.2
87
The version of the "trust fund" approach under discussion in
2005 requires that the trust fund be evaluated annually to ensure it
has enough monies to compensate claimants. 288  There is a
controversial "sunset" provision that would allow claims to resume
in the tort system if the trust fund were to become insolvent, subject
to venue restrictions.2 89  This provision has been criticized as
rendering the trust fund approach ineffective, because plaintiffs'
lawyers could drain the trust fund and then revert to the tort
system. 29  Plaintiffs' lawyers and union representatives argue there
must be recourse in the tort system for those claimants.291 S. 852
provides that the federal government would not have any obligations
to pay asbestos claims under this approach.
The second approach would require that asbestos claimants
demonstrate that they have an asbestos-related impairment under
objective "medical criteria" before their claims could move forward
287. Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Rochelle Tedesco, Congress
Should Act to Resolve the National Asbestos Crisis: The Basis in Law and
Public Policy For Meaningful Progress, 44 S. TEX. L. REv. 839, 879 (2003).
288. Id., tit. IV, § 405.
289. Id., tit. IV, § 405(f) & (g).
290. Past experience with trust funds that have bypasses to the tort system
have not had sanguine results. For example, a $4.2 billion trust that was
established for so-called "victims" in breast implant litigation with a bypass to
the tort system ultimately went broke. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars:
The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1343, 1404-
10 (1995). As common sense would suggest, the weaker claims went to the
trust and the stronger claims went back into the tort system. Similar results
have occurred in early attempts to have an automobile no-fault system, with
escape valves into the tort system. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., PROSSER,
WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 1243 (10th ed. 2000).
291. See, e.g., Hearing on The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act
Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (Jan. 11, 2005)
(statement of Michael Forsey, Esq., on behalf of the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America); Hearing on Asbestos Litigation Before the Sen. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Sept. 25, 2002) (statement of Frederick Baron,
partner, Baron & Budd, former president of the Association of Trial Lawyers
of America, presenting ATLA's views on asbestos litigation); Hearing on the
Asbestos Litigation Crisis Continues-It is Time for Congress to Act Before the
Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Mar. 5, 2003) (statement of
Jonathan Hiatt, General Counsel, American Federation of Labor and Congress
of Industrial Organizations); Hearing on Asbestos Litigation Before the Sen.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Sept. 25, 2002) (statement of Mr. Hiatt).
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in court.2 9 2 Statutes of limitations would be tolled so that exposed
persons who are unimpaired would have their claims preserved so
they could file a claim in the future should they develop an impairing
condition. Claimants suffering from an asbestos-related impairment
would have their cases tried in the ordinary tort system.293 This
approach would substantially relieve courts of claims initiated by the
non-sick. It would help preserve assets needed to compensate the
truly sick.
294
Additional ways to address asbestos litigation could include
limiting or abolishing punitive damages in asbestos cases. Asbestos
has not been manufactured for years and the conduct that allegedly
caused the injury occurred decades ago; repeated punishments are
not necessary and there is no existing wrongful activity to deter.
29 5
Plaintiffs also should be required to present more rigorous scientific
or epidemiological evidence that a particular defendant's product
caused the plaintiff's alleged injuries, whether this requirement is set
by the courts through Daubert hearings or by the legislature.
296
2. The Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act
The Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2004 ("LARA"), 297 has
two components. First, it seeks to reinstitute mandatory sanctions for
frivolous lawsuits by reforming Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 298 The Act would reverse certain changes made to Rule
11 in 1993, which rendered sanctions discretionary rather than
292. See The Asbestos Claims Criteria and Compensation Act of 2003, S.
413, 108th Cong. §§ 2(a)(7), 4 (2003), WL 2003 CONG US S 413, introduced
by Sen. Nickles (R-OK); Asbestos Compensation Fairness Act of 2005, H.R.
1957, 109th Cong. § 3, WL 2005 CONG US HR 1957, introduced by Rep.
Cannon (R-UT).
293. Id. at § 4.
294. See Schwartz, Behrens & Tedesco supra note 287, at 872.
295. See Mark A. Behrens & Barry M. Parsons, Responsible Public Policy
Demands an End to the Hemorrhaging Effect of Punitive Damages in Asbestos
Cases, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 137 (2001).
296. See David E. Bernstein, Keeping Junk Science Out of Asbestos
Litigation, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 11 (2003).
297. H.R. 4571, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004) (introduced by Rep. Lamar
Smith (R.-Tex.)).
298. Id. at § 2(1)(A); Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
146 F.R.D. 401,421 (1993).
1183
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:1121
mandatory. 299 Unfortunately, the 1993 amendments allowed judges
to ignore or forget sanctions. 30 0  For that reason, irresponsible
personal injury lawyers could game the legal system. 30 1
The second component addresses rampant nationwide forum
shopping. Forum shopping occurs when what some call "litigation
tourists" are guided by their attorneys into bringing claims in so-
called "judicial hellholes." 30 2 As documented by the ATRA, these
jurisdictions have become a powerful magnet for out-of-state
plaintiffs who have no logical connection with the forum. The
plaintiffs were not injured in the jurisdiction, never lived in the
jurisdiction and do not work in the jurisdiction.30 3 Litigation tourists
do not help the states that they visit. They pay no taxes, only
burdening the courts of that state that are paid for by local taxpayers.
They delay justice to those who live there. The litigation tourist is
only there to sue. LARA helps shut down these "judicial hellholes"
with equity and fairness. The Act allows a plaintiff to file a case
only where he or she resides at the time of filing, resided at the time
of the alleged injury, or the place where circumstances giving rise to
the injury occurred, or in the state of the defendant's principal place
of business.
30 4
299. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401,
508 (1993).
300. See id.
301. When the 1993 amendments weakening Rule 11 were approved, Justice
Scalia dissented from the process, noting that,
[i]n my view, those who file frivolous suits and pleadings should have
no 'safe harbor.' The Rules should be solicitous of the abused (the
courts and the opposing party), and not of the abuser. Under the
revised Rule [11], parties will be able to file thoughtless, reckless, and
harassing pleadings, secure in the knowledge that they have nothing to
lose: If objection is raised, they can retreat without penalty.
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 508
(1993).
302. See BRINGING JUSTICE TO JUDICIAL HELLHOLES, supra note 254, at 41.
303. See, e.g., id. at 21 (noting that in Hampton County, South Carolina
"[n]o regard is paid to the site of the claimed injury, the plaintiffs home, and
the fact that a defendant's headquarters may be hundreds of miles away.").
304. H.R. 4571, 108th Cong. § 4 (2d Sess. 2004).
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3. The Multiple Punitive Damages Fairness Act
The Multiple Punitive Damages Fairness Act of 1997305 is not
currently before Congress, but it should be given new consideration.
The Act was designed to bring some modicum of fairness to punitive
damages awards. 306 The Act was developed by Republican Senator
Orrin Hatch, former Republican Senator John Danforth, and
Democrat Senator Joseph Lieberman. The Act would establish the
general rule that punitive damages may only be awarded once for
harms based on a single act or course of conduct.30 7 An additional
punitive award may be permitted when the court determines in a
pretrial hearing that there is new and substantial evidence of
additional wrongful behavior by the defendant, other than injury to
the claimant.
30 8
The Act would not affect the type of damages that compensate
plaintiffs for their harm. Both economic and noneconomic harm are
taken care of through compensatory damage awards. 30 9 Punitive
damages are permitted only in order to deter the wrongdoer from
repeating the wrongful act and to deter others from taking similar
actions.3 0 Thus, the legislation would not adversely impact the
rights of plaintiffs to be fully and fairly compensated for any and all
harms. In fact, this legislation would protect the right of future
plaintiffs to collect for actual damages by preventing defendants'
assets from being needlessly depleted through windfall awards to
earlier-filing claimants.
311
With the exception of those lawyers who reap potentially
millions of dollars in fees from repeat punitive damages, nobody
seriously argues that repeatedly punishing the same company for one
act is fair or benefits society. To the contrary, out of control punitive
awards have had a debilitating effect on many vital industries.
312
What's more, awarding punitive damages over and over without
305. S. 78, 105th Cong. (1st Sess. 1997).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. See supra note 52 and accompanying text; Viscusi, supra note 36, at
383.
311. S. 78, 105th Cong. § 3(a) (1st Sess. 1997).
312. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 62 at 142, and accompanying text.
1185
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:1121
limits for cases arising out of a single act or course of conduct is
arbitrary and fundamentally unfair and threatens constitutional due
process guarantees.
313
Federal action is needed to provide a nationwide solution to the
problem. The Multiple Punitive Damages Fairness Act would
uniformly and effectively protect claimants from the risk that
corporate defendants will be unfairly stripped of their ability to pay
compensatory damages. 314 At the same time, the legislation would
address legitimate due process concerns that arise when a business is
punished repeatedly and without limit for a single act or course of
conduct.
31 5
B. State Solutions
States have been much more aggressive in solving litigation
problems within their own borders. Just since 2004, a number of
important reforms have been enacted. For example, the most wide
ranging reform occurred in Mississippi, where the state legislature
enacted a comprehensive civil justice reform bill, H.B. 13, in June
3162004. The law promises to help Mississippi shed its reputation for
housing "judicial hellholes." Among other things, the law eliminates
opportunities for the abuse of venue and joinder rules;317 limits
recovery of noneconomic damages against defendants (other than a
health care liability defendant) to $1 million, while keeping in place
a $500,000 limit on noneconomic damages in medical liability
actions; 3 18 puts tighter limits on punitive damages that may be
awarded against medium and small businesses; 319 eliminates joint
and several liability for all defendants; 320 and provides greater
protections to innocent, non-manufacturer sellers of a product.
321
313. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
314. S. 78, 105th Cong. § 3 (1st Sess. 1997).
315. Id.
316. H.B. 13, 2004 Leg., 2d Ex. Sess. (Miss. 2004).
317. Id. at § 1.
318. Id. at§2.
319. Id. at § 4(3)(a).
320. Id. at § 6 (Except those defendants "who consciously and deliberately
pursue a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, or actively take part
in it.").
321. Id. at § 3.
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In addition, Ohio became the first state to enact legislation
setting minimum medical requirements for asbestos and silica/mixed
dust claims, establishing rules for premises liability actions and
prescribing requirements for shareholder liability for asbestos claims
under the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.322 Ohio also passed
comprehensive civil justice reform legislation in 2004, and
Georgia did so in 2005.324 Ten states enacted legislation in 2004 to
curb frivolous regulation through litigation lawsuits against the
restaurant and fast food industry.325  At least six states enacted
legislation to limit the amount of appeals bonds and otherwise make
appeals more available to companies sued in "bet the industry"
lawsuits.326 In 2005, Texas, Georgia, and Florida followed Ohio's
lead in requiring asbestos and silica to demonstrate functional
impairment in order to bring a claim.
327
Voters in the November 2004 election also approved civil
justice reform ballot initiatives in four states. Shakedown lawsuits
322. See H.B. 292, 125th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2004); H.B. 342, 125th Gen.
Assem. (Ohio 2004). The bills are groundbreaking in a number of respects.
First, the asbestos bill[, H.B. 292,] marks the first time that medical
criteria requirements have been adopted in legislation. The approach
is modeled after judicially created asbestos docket management plans
that exist in a number of courts.... Second, Ohio is the first state to
adopt either a legislative or judicial plan for curbing silica suits. The
legislation took a "holistic approach" in adopting the silica bill[, H.B.
342,] acting to avoid having silica filings exacerbated by lawyers who
might be discouraged from bringing weak or meritless asbestos suits
as a result of H.B. 292.
Mark A. Behrens & Phil S. Goldberg, Asbestos Litigation Reform: Where Is It
Headed?, 15 PRODS. LIAB. (ABA, Sec. of Litig., Comm. on Prods. Liab. Litig.)
No. 1, Spring/Summer 2004, at 1, 4.
323. S.B. 80, 125th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2005) (approved Jan. 6, 2005).
324. S.B. 3, 2005-2006 Leg., 1st Sess. (Ga. 2005).
325. See Am. Tort Reform Ass'n, 2004 State Tort Reform Enactments
(Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Missouri, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah and Washington all enacted obesity litigation reform
legislation), at http://www.atra.org/files.cgi/7797_2004enactments.pdf (last
visited Nov. 15, 2004).
326. See id. (Georgia, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, South Carolina and
Virginia enacted appeal bond legislation).
327. See Mark A. Behrens & Phil Goldberg, Asbestos Litigation: Momentum
Builds for State-Based Medical Criteria Solutions to Address Filings by the
Non-Sick, 20:6 MEALEY'S LIT. REP.: ASBESTOS 33 (Apr. 13, 2005).
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regarding business practices 328 will be a thing of the past in
California. 329 After voters' approval of Proposition 64 in November
2004, a lawsuit can only be filed if there is an injury or financial or
property loss due to an unfair business practice.330 Nevada voters
passed a law to limit attorney fees and awards in medical liability
litigation.331 Florida voters acted to limit attorney fees in medical
liability litigation.332  Wyoming voters approved the state
legislature's ability to enact laws requiring alternative dispute
resolution or medical panel review before a person can file a tort
lawsuit against a health care provider.
333
These successes demonstrate each state may have unique
liability issues, but often there are broader solutions that can be
modified in each state to curtail the abuses specific to those
jurisdictions. To facilitate state tort reform efforts, national
bipartisan legislative organizations have passed model legislation
that states can adapt as needed. Some examples are explained below.
328. See Walter Olson, The Shakedown State, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2003, at
A10. See generally Eliot G. Disner & Noah E. Jussim, So Unfair and Foul:
The Scandals Involving the Unscrupulous Application of the Private Attorney
General Provision of the Unfair Competition Act Cry out for a Sensible
Solution, 26 L.A. LAw. 42, Nov. 2003 (discussing the unethical application of
California's Unfair Competition Act that initiated bipartisan reform).
329. See Cal. Sec. State, Cal. Gen. Elec., Nov. 2, 2004, State Ballot
Measures, (indicating Proposition 64 passed by 59% to 41%), at
http://vote2004.ss.ca.gov/Retums/prop/00.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2004).
330. See Prop. 64 (Cal. Gen. Elec., Nov. 2, 2004) (limiting California's
Unfair Business Competition Laws), http://voterguide.ss.ca.gov/propositions/
prop64text.pdf (last visited June 10, 2005).
331. See Nev. Sec. State., Nev. Gen. Elec., Nov. 2, 2004, State Ballot
Measure No. 3, at http://sos.state.nv.us/nvelection/2004_bq/bq3.htm (last
visited June 10, 2005).
332. See The Medical Liability Claimant's Compensation Amendment,
Proposed Constitutional Amendment No. 3, Fla. Gen. Elect., Nov. 2, 2004,
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/pdf/proposedamendenglish.pdf (last
visited Jan. 23, 2004); Fla. Sec. State., Fla. Gen. Elec., Nov. 2, 2004, State
Ballot Measure No. 3, at http://enight.dos.state.fl.us/ (last visited June 10,
2005).
333. See Wyo. Sec. State., Wyo. Gen. Elec., Nov. 2, 2004, Const. Amend. C,
at http://soswy.state.wy.us/election/2004/results/04-gsum.htm (last visited
Nov. 15, 2004).
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1. Legal Consumer's Bill of Rights
The American Legislative Exchange Council ("ALEC") has
developed the Legal Consumer's Bill of Rights Act, a model bill that
would protect ordinary consumers against predatory fee practices by
high pressure lawyers and their agents. 334 The ALEC model bill has
its genesis in a proposal developed by HALT, a national nonprofit,
nonpartisan public interest group of more than 50,000 members.
335
ALEC's model act protects legal consumers by requiring
attorneys to provide a statement of clients' rights and lawyers'
responsibilities. This would include a written explanation of the fee
agreement and alternative billing options, as well as updates
regarding the progress of the case, the hours of work to be expended,
and all expenses that may be incurred.336  In this regard, lawyers
would be required to convey the same types of information to
prospective clients as funeral directors, auto mechanics, and many
other service providers. This would simply require a lawyer to
articulate to the client the same internal calculations the lawyer must
334. See ALEC Model Consumer's Bill of Rights, at § 2 [hereinafter ALEC
Model Bill], http://www.alec.org. See generally Victor E. Schwartz et al.,
Consumer Protection in the Legal Marketplace: A Legal Consumer's Bill of
Rights is Needed, 15 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 1 (2002) (discussing the need
for legal consumers to be informed of certain basic rights). Legal Consumer's
Bill of Rights legislation has been introduced in a number of states. See, e.g.,
Legal Consumer's Protection Act, A.B. No. 2939, 2001-2002 Sess. (Cal.
2002); Legal Consumer's Bill of Rights Act, S.B. 994, 91st Gen. Assem., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2002); Legal Consumer's Bill of Rights, H.B. 1817, 48th Leg.,
1st Sess. (Okla. 2001); Legal Consumer's Bill of Rights, H.B. 2420, 2001 Sess.
(Kan. 2001).
335. See Legal Consumer Bill of Rights Proposal, at http://www.halt.org/
refornprojects/consumer rights/ (last visited June 17, 2005); see generally
Michael Higgins, Getting Out the Word. Legal Consumer Group Wants
Lawyers to Distribute Client Bill of Rights, 84 A.B.A. J. 22 (Sept. 1998)
(discussing HALT's Legal Consumer Bill of Rights "that would require
lawyers to provide clients with a written explanation of their rights."). At the
federal level, President George W. Bush has endorsed a "Client's Bill of
Rights" to allow federal courts to hear challenges to attorneys' fees, and
require attorneys to disclose their ethical obligation to charge reasonable fees
and the potential range of those fees. See Scott S. Greenberger, Bush Aims at
Federal Tort Reform, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Feb. 10, 2000, at A7; Ron
Hutcheson & Tish Wells, Bush Has Four Years to Put Promises to Test,
MILWAUKEE J. SENT., Dec. 17, 2000, at 10A.
336. ALEC Model Bill, supra note 334, at § 2.
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make when deciding to take the client's case.
In addition, the model legislation would require all attorneys to
keep accurate time records and, at the conclusion of the case, provide
their clients with detailed information regarding the amount of time
spent on the case and any fees and expenses to be charged.337 The
attorney also would need to disclose his or her actual hourly rate,
calculated by dividing the total fee by the number of hours spent on
the case.338 This information would enable the client or a court to
determine the reasonableness of the fee.
339
ALEC's model legislation also would require lawyers to inform
their clients of their right to request an objective review of the
reasonableness of a contingency fee.340 This functional equivalent of
a "Legal Better Business Bureau" would provide clients who believe
they have been overcharged with the information necessary to
challenge the bill. The challenge would go through the current
mechanism for fee disputes between lawyers and clients, such as a
court or bar committee, and would be "based on factors such as
whether liability was contested, whether the amount of damages was
clear, and how much time the lawyer actually spent on the case."
341
Informing clients of their right to an objective review of the fee
charged would provide an important safeguard to keep fees fair and
ensure that more of the recovery will go to injured persons rather
than to their lawyers in low-risk, easy-to-win cases.
2. Full and Fair Noneconomic Damages Act
ALEC has a proposal to curb arbitrary and excessive
noneconomic damages. 342  ALEC's model Full and Fair
Noneconomic Damages Act 343 does not place hard limits on
noneconomic damages. Instead, it seeks to ensure that such awards
serve their true purpose, compensation. 344 The Act would also assure
noneconomic damages are subject to fair and proper post-trial and
appellate review, similar to the process used to review punitive
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. A copy is attached at Appendix A.
343. ALEC Full and Fair Noneconomic Damages Act, http://www.alec.org.
344. Id. at § 2.
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damages for excessiveness.
345
The model act would begin by incorporating a basic principle of
tort law. It would prohibit consideration of "guilt" evidence when
determining an award for pain and suffering. 346 Under the model act,
the court would instruct jurors that the law requires them to consider
only what it would take to compensate the plaintiff for pain and
suffering. 347 Jurors would be told that in determining noneconomic
damages, they could not consider any alleged wrongdoing,
misconduct, or guilt of the defendant, or evidence of the defendant's
wealth, or any other evidence offered for the purpose of
punishment.
348
When the plaintiff requests punitive damages, the model act
would require that the trial court conduct a bifurcated trial by the
same jury, if requested by the defendant. 349 In the first stage of the
trial, the jury would determine whether the defendant was liable and,
if so, the amount of compensatory damages necessary to make the
plaintiff whole.35 0 This first stage would include determination of an
award for pain and suffering.351 Evidence of wrongdoing would be
inadmissible at this phase.352 If the jury found the defendant liable
and awarded compensatory damages, then the jury would determine
whether the defendant's conduct warranted punitive damages in a
second, separate stage of the trial.35 3 This procedure would limit the
use of guilt evidence to inappropriately boost pain and suffering
awards in cases where punitive damages were sought.
354
If the jury awards noneconomic damages, the model act would
then require the trial court to scrutinize the award during the post-
trial phase. 355 Rather than undertaking a cursory review of whether
the award "shocked the conscience," the trial court would analyze
345. Id. at § 6.
346. Id. at § 4.
347. Id. at § 3. Pain and suffering under this model Act includes not only
physical pain and suffering but also other non-pecuniary losses such as mental
and emotional pain or anguish and loss of consortium. Id.
348. Id. at § 4.
349. Id. at § 5.
350. See id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at § 4.
353. Id. at § 5.
354. Id. at § 2.
355. Id. at § 6.
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several factors before entering a final judgment. First, the court
would consider whether the facts of the case or the arguments of
counsel inflamed the passion or prejudice of the trier of fact, or
whether the jury improperly considered the wealth of the defendant
or improperly considered the misconduct of the defendant so as to
punish the defendant in circumvention of statutory or constitutional
standards applicable to punitive damage awards.356 Next, the court
would consider whether the noneconomic damage award was in
excess of verdicts involving comparable injuries to similarly situated
plaintiffs.357 If so, the court could uphold the award if it found
extraordinary circumstances in the record to account for an award in
excess of those in similar cases.
35 8
Finally, the model act would require meaningful appellate
review to further ensure that noneconomic awards served a
compensatory, and not a punitive, purpose.359  It would require
appellate courts to engage in a de novo review when considering an
appeal of a noneconomic damages award on the grounds of
excessiveness. 36  This means that the appellate court would
356. Id.
357. Id. Courts have successfully used this comparative approach to
incorporate an objective element into the review of non-pecuniary,
noneconomic damage awards, a practice that is supported by legal scholars.
See David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages
Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of
Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REv.
1109, 1134-35 (1995) (noting that the comparative approach is most widely
practiced for the review of general damage awards in New York); David W.
Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64
N.Y.U. L. REv. 256, 323 (1989) ("It is not enough for reviewing judges simply
to ask whether the specific factual circumstances of the award justify a
particularly large award. They must also ask whether the facts indicate that the
plaintiff has suffered sufficiently more than similarly situated plaintiffs to
justify an award larger than other juries or judges have granted."); see also
Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards,
23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 763, 777 (1995) (proposing that jurors in all cases in
which non-pecuniary damages are sought receive a grid of the median, high,
and low awards in similar cases in the same state during a contemporaneous
time period, as a means of avoiding extraordinary awards and the need for
appellate review).
358. ALEC Full and Fair Noneconomic Damages Act, supra note 343, at
§ 6.
359. See id.
360. Id.
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independently consider the legality of the noneconomic damage
award, rather than rely on the judgment of the trial court absent
finding an abuse of discretion. This de novo standard would require
the same type of thorough review mandated by the Supreme Court in
determining whether a punitive damage award is unconstitutionally
excessive.
361
IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S. civil justice system is a highly decentralized transfer
mechanism. In the last couple of decades, areas of the litigation
system have been skewed so that, on the whole, the tort system can
no longer provide the appropriate balance between costs and
benefits. Regardless of whether this imbalance is created by profit
motive, some courts' abandonment of fundamental tort principles, or
the inability of legal rules to meet the challenges of 21st Century
litigation, the goals of efficiency, timeliness, predictability, and
fairness are not being met. As a result, the compensation and
deterrence functions of the judicial system are not working as they
should.
Currently, several trends are pushing the litigation system
further off-kilter. Tort system costs continue to rise at astronomical
rates, further skewing the cost-benefit analysis. These high costs
also are being disproportionately shouldered by defendants,
communities, and ordinary consumers. In addition, the litigation
system is being asked to process claims that have more to do with
regulating industry than compensating individuals, something it is
ill-equipped to do. Finally, judges are relaxing the traditional
elements of the law to allow more claims into the system and
depriving juries of information they need to make sound and fair
decisions.
As judicial and legislative policymakers look for the right ways
to fix the system, they should consider the core trends that are
leading to the problem and avoid solutions that are only prophylactic
in nature. Because some "judicial hellhole" jurisdictions are likely to
resist change, the most effective way to restore balance to the civil
361. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424,
436 (2001); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,416-18
(2003).
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justice system is through federal and state legislation. The 2004
election showed that the American people have the will to make
these changes either through their elected representatives or on their
own at the ballot box.
APPENDIX: FULL & FAIR NONECONOMIC DAMAGES ACT
SUMMARY
Pain and suffering awards are intended to compensate an
injured plaintiff for the pain and suffering resulting from an injury
caused by the defendant.' They are not intended as punishment
for the defendant or to deter future misconduct.
2
Constitutional and statutory controls increasingly have been
placed on punitive damages, but few legal guideposts exist to help
jurors fix the amount of pain and suffering awards. As a result,
there is an incentive for some to seek to drive up the amount of
pain and suffering awards by focusing on the defendant's alleged
misconduct.3 Jurors calculating the amount of these awards may
be excessively influenced by the presentations of the parties at
trial. Pain and suffering awards may therefore be improperly
influenced by bias, passion, or prejudice. ALEC's model Full and
Fair Noneconomic Damages Act would preclude the improper
use of "bad act" evidence in the calculation of pain and suffering
damages. It also seeks to enhance the opportunities for
meaningful judicial review of such awards.
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1965).
2. See Am. Law Inst., 2 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL
INJURY-REPORTER'S STUDY 199-200 (1991) (observing that pain and
suffering damages reflect concerns with a variety of types of non-monetary
loss, including tangible physical pain suffered at the time of Injury and during
recuperation, the anguish and terror felt In the face of Impending injury or
death, the Immediate emotional distress and long-term loss of love and
companionship resulting from the Injury or death of a close family member,
and the lost pleasures of personal and social activities resulting from a
permanent physical impairment).
Adopted by ALEC's Civil Justice Task Force at the Annual Meeting
July 30, 2004. Approved by ALEC's Board of Directors in August, 2004.
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SECTION 1. TITLE.
This Act shall be called and may be cited as the "Full and Fair
Noneconomic Damages Act."
SECTION 2. FINDINGS.
(a) The purpose of this Act is to ensure that individuals receive
full and fair compensatory damages, including damages for pain
and suffering.
(b) Pain and suffering awards are intended to provide an injured
person with compensation for the pain and suffering resulting
from the injury at issue in a particular lawsuit.
(c) Punitive damages are intended to punish a defendant for
wrongful conduct. Punitive damages are subject to certain
statutory requirements, must be based on the appropriate evidence,
and must be in accordance with the constitutional jurisprudence of
the Supreme Court of the United States.
(d) Pain and suffering awards are distinct from punitive damages.
Pain and suffering awards are intended to compensate a person for
his or her loss. They are not intended to punish a defendant for
wrongful conduct.
(e) For that reason, evidence that juries may consider in awarding
pain and suffering damages is different from evidence courts may
consider for punitive damages. For example, the amount of a
plaintiffs pain and suffering is not relevant to a decision on
wrongdoing, and the degree of the defendant's wrongdoing is not
relevant to the amount of pain and suffering.
(f) The size of noneconomic damage awards, which includes pain
and suffering, has increased dramatically in recent years. While
pain and suffering awards are inherently subjective, it is believed
that this inflation of noneconomic damages is partially due to the
improper consideration of evidence of wrongdoing in assessing
pain and suffering damages.
(g) Inflated damage awards create an improper resolution of civil
justice claims. The increased and improper costs of litigation and
resulting rise in insurance premiums is passed on to the general
public through higher prices for products and services.
(h) Therefore, courts should provide juries with clear instructions
about the purpose of pain and suffering damages. Courts should
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instruct juries that evidence of misconduct is not to be considered
in deciding compensation for noneconomic damages. Rather, it is
to be considered solely for the purpose of deciding punitive
damage awards.
(i) In cases in which punitive damages are requested, defendants
should have the right to request bifurcation of a trial to ensure that
evidence of misconduct is not inappropriately considered by the
jury in its determination of liability and compensatory damages.
() As an additional protection, trial and appellate courts should
rigorously review pain and suffering awards to ensure that they
properly serve compensatory purposes and are not excessive.
SECTION 3. NONECONOMIC DAMAGES; DEFINED.
(a) Noneconomic damages which are recoverable in tort actions
include damages awarded for the purpose of compensating a
claimant for physical pain and suffering, mental or emotional
pain or anguish, loss of consortium, disfigurement, physical
impairment, loss of companionship and society, inconvenience,
loss of enjoyment of life, and all other nonpecuniary losses other
than exemplary or punitive damages.
(b) Pain and suffering is one type of noneconomic damage and
means the actual physical pain and suffering that is the proximate
result of a physical injury sustained by a person.
(c) 'Exemplary damages' means any damages awarded as a
penalty or by way of punishment but not for compensatory
purposes. Exemplary damages are neither economic nor
noneconomic damages. 'Exemplary damages' includes punitive
damages.
SECTION 4. NONECONOMIC DAMAGES; DETERMINATION.
(a) In determining noneconomic damages, the fact finder may not
consider:
1. Evidence of a defendant's alleged wrongdoing, misconduct,
or guilt.
2. Evidence of the defendant's wealth or financial resources.
3. Any other evidence that is offered for the purpose of
punishing the defendant, rather than offered for a
compensatory purpose.
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SECTION 5. PROCEDURE FOR TRIAL OF COMPENSATORY & PUNITIVE
DAMAGES.
(a) All actions tried before a jury involving punitive damages
shall, if requested by any defendant, be conducted in a bifurcated
trial before the same jury.
(b) In the first stage of a bifurcated trial, the jury shall determine
liability for compensatory damages and the amount of
compensatory damages or nominal damages. Evidence relevant
only to the issues of punitive damages shall not be admissible in
this stage.
(c) Punitive damages may be awarded only if compensatory
damages have been awarded in the first stage of the trial. An
award of nominal damages cannot support an award of punitive
damages.
(d) In the second stage of a bifurcated trial, the jury shall
determine if a defendant is liable for punitive damages.
SECTION 6. REVIEW OF NONECONOMIC DAMAGE AWARDS.
(a) Upon post-judgment motion, a trial court shall perform a
rigorous analysis of the evidence supporting a noneconomic
damages award challenged as excessive. Such analysis shall
consider the following nonexclusive factors:
(1) whether the evidence presented or the arguments of
counsel resulted in one or more of the following events in the
determination of a noneconomic damage award:
(i) inflamed the passion or prejudice of the trier of
fact;
(ii) improper consideration of the wealth of the
defendant; or
(iii) improper consideration of the misconduct of the
defendant so as to punish the defendant in
circumvention of [the limitation on punitive
damage awards provided by REFERENCE STATE
STATUTES FOR CAP/BURDEN OF PROOF, IF
APPLICABLE or] constitutional standards applicable
to punitive damage awards.
(2) whether the verdict is in excess of verdicts involving
comparable injuries to similarly situated plaintiffs; and
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(3) whether there were any extraordinary circumstances in
the record to account for an award in excess of what was
granted by courts to similarly situated plaintiffs, with
consideration to the injury type, severity of injury, and the
plaintiff's age.
(b) A trial court upholding a noneconomic damages award
challenged as excessive shall set forth in writing its reasons for
upholding the award.
(c) A reviewing court shall use a de novo standard of review
when considering an appeal of a noneconomic damages award on
the grounds of excessiveness.
SECTION 7. EFFECTIVE DATE
The provisions of this Act shall take effect on the date of
enactment and apply to all civil actions filed after such date.
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